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THE BATTLE OF MEGIDDO
A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTb AND LITERATURE
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF niiLOSornY
DEPARTMENT OF ORIENTAL LANG'^AGF.S ND LITERATURES
BY
HAROLD HAYDEN NELSON
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Private Edition, Distributed By
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
1913
EXCHANGE
View VI. — General i)iinoraina of the battlefield taken from Knoll F looking northwest
Ube TUnirermtp ot CbicaQO
THE BATTLE OF MEGIDDO
A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF ORIENTAL LANGUAGES AND LITERATURES
BY
HAROLD HAYDEN NELSON
Private Edition, Distributed By
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
1913
XTbe illnirersitp of Cbtcago
THE BATTLE OF MEGIDDO
A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND LITERATURE
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF ORIENTAL LANGUAGES AND LITERATURES
BY
HAROLD HAYDEN NELSON
Private Edition, Distributed By
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LIBRARIES
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
1913
^x:
PREFACE
The text of this study was prepared and printed before the war, but
owing to the fact that I was confined behind the Turkish fines in Syria
durirg the whole of the war, it was impossible to secure the cuts of the
illustrations and maps till some time after the conclusion of hostilities.
Meanwhile the photographs had suffered from the lapse of time and an
effort to secure new ones in the summer of 1920 failed owing to the stupidity
of certain Syrian auto-drivers. But the photograi)hs, such as they are. will
nevertheless serve to illustrate the text.
Had the University of Chicago regulations governing the publication of
theses permitted, I would gladly have rewritten the whole manuscript in the
light of the recent campaign of the Eg>'ptian Expeditionar\' Force under
Lord AUenby in the same region in which Thutmose III, nearly 3,500 years
earUer, also defeated an enemy advancing from the north toward Egj^pt.
There are certain interesting and striking parallels and contrasts between the
strategy' of the earliest and of the latest victorious commanders of campaigns
in central Palestine.
This study is confined almost entirely to an effort to interpret the Annals
of Thutmose III in the light of the geography of the environs of Megiddo.
I have entered into no philological discussion, although such points were
thoroughly considered in preparation of the translation of the Annals. I
regret that 1 am unable to incorporate certain material bearing on the sub-
ject of this study which has appeared since the text was printed in Beirut,
Syria, in 1913, and also that I cannot make use of certain valuable suggestions
made by those who campaigned in Palestine in 1917-18. A number of typo-
graphical errors have crept into the text which were unavoidable under the
circumstances in which it was printed.
Hauold 11. Nelson
461758
■KGHAKSS
THE BATTLE OF MEGIDDO
INTRODUCTION
The Battle of Megiddo on May 15th, 1479 B.C. between the Egyptians
under Thutmose III and the allied forces of the Syrian states is the first
battle in history which we can study in any detail. Most of the ancient
oriental accounts of battles are mere statements of the forces engaged
and of the outcome of the conflicts. Among the Egyptian records, how-
ever, there are preserved in considerable detail the narratives of two or
three engagements from which we can gather, with greater or less
clearness, the general plan of each battle, the disposition of the troops
and the manoeuvres of the opposing armies.' So far these battles have
been studied either without reference to the topography of the battle-
fields, or with insufficient data regarding the physical features of the
area of operations and the bearing they must have had on the course of
the engagement. In the following discussion of the Battle of Megiddo it
has been my endeavor to interpret the scanty records of the conflict
preserved in hieroglyphic in the light of the topography of the region,
which I studied on two visits to the battlefield in the summers of 1909
and 1912. On those two occasions I made a series of surveys and took a
number of photographs which are here reproduced. They include a suf-
ficient number of views to bear out my observations on the topography
which are contained in the text of this discussion. I have used as the
basis of my plan of the battlefield the excellent map in Schumacher's
Tell el-Mutesellim, Band II, adding myself certain details not found on
the original, especially the configuration of the hills to the west and
I Besides the Battle of Megiddo, compare, for the Battle of Kadesh, Breasted, Battle of
Kadeih, and for the siege of Memphis by Piankhi see Breasted, /Incient Records, IV, 857-865.
2 The Battle of Megiddo
south of Megiddo, and verifying most of the altitudes found on Schu-
macher's map. In this connection I wish to thank for their assistance
my colleagues. Dr. Harvey Porter, of Beirut, Syria, who visited Megiddo
with me in 1909, and especially Professor Alfred H. Joy, also of Beirut,
who was with me in 1912, without whose assistance my work would
have been attended with great difficulty and delay.
In the introduction to his "Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland"
Kromayer says:
"Wenn es in der modernen Kriegsgeschichte von je her als unerlassliche Voraus-
sctzung fiir die Erkenntnis gegolten hat, dass den Schilderungen der Feldziige
und Schlachten Kartcn und Plane beigefiigt seien, so muss man sich wundern,
dass man bei der Behandlung antiker Schlachten so lange Zeit geglaubt hat,
dieses Hilfsmittel cntbehren und auch ohne dasselbe zu einem leidlichen Ver-
standnisse kommen zu konnen.
"Es braucht ja vor Leutcn, die auch nur ein ganz klein wenig mit den Beding-
ungen dieses Studiums bekannt sind, eigentlich gar nicht mehr ausgesproch-
en zu werden, dass selbst die genaucste und lebendigste Schilderung solcher
Ereignisse fur sich allein tot und unanschaulich bleibt, dass ein Blick aut" eine
gute Karte mehr gibt als stundenlanges Studium oft nur irrtumveranlassender
Beschreibungen. "
I have quoted at such length from Kromayer on account of the impor-
tance, as it seems to me, of his position on the study of military history
in its application to oriental military movements, a position which can-
not be too much emphasized and which, if adopted by some oriental his-
torians, would have prevented many of the impossibilities in the inter-
pretation of ancient historical inscriptions which are now found in some
of the current histories. It has been my effort in the following study to
take Kromayer's position throughout. I have consulted the discussions
of the battle contained in the chief histories, those of Breasted, Brugsch,
Budge, Hall, Maspero, Meyer, Petrie and Wiedemann, and have also
made use of Schumacher's topographical and archaeological studies in
MuNDPV and in his Tell-el-Mutesellim. The chronology of the
campaign is that of Breasted, as presented in his Ancient Records, II,
409, which is based on his studies in AZ, 37, 123 ff. and 39, 60-68. For a
bibliography of the older publications of the hieroglyphic sources the
reader is referred to Breasted's Ancient Records, II, 391, note a. The pre-
sent study is based on the text of the Annals of Thutmoselll in Sethe's
Urkunden der 18. Dynastie, pp. 647-667, with a few changes and omis-
sions where Sethe's text is entirely a restoration by the editor. I have
The Battle of Megiddo 3
also taken into account such other references to the battle as may be
found in the Eighteenth Dynasty inscriptions, all of which are publish-
ed in Sethe's Urkunden.
At this point I wish to acknowledge my great indebtedness to Pro-
fessor Breasted, from whom I have received constant encouragement and
continued and most valuable suggestions. Any acknowledgment of
the help and inspiration derived from his stimulating teaching is, at
best, inadequate. Since the appearance of his Ancient Records any one
who attempts to deal with historical subjects in the Egyptian field must
consciously or unconsciously appropriate much from that valuable mine
of information. Though the translation of the Annals appearing in the
Records is based on an inferior text to the one I have been able to use
(as the Urkunden did not appear till after the Records were already out),
nevertheless T have drawn much assistance from Dr. Breasted's transla-
tion, in some cases even adopting his very words where I felt there was
ho reason for changing them. Many of the variations from his translation
Dr. Breasted would himself incorporate in substance into a new edition
of the Records.
I wish also to thank my colleague in Professor Breasted's seminar,
Mr. George Allen, who has made several helpful suggestions on doubt-
ful passages in the text.
Thk Battle of Mkoiddo
I
THE TOPOGRAPHY OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS
THE ANNALS, LINES 6-13
Urk. 647 Year 22, month four of the second season, day 25; [his Majes-
ty was in the fortress of]2 (7) Tharu on the first victorious
campaign [to repulse the invaders]-' (8) of the boundaries of
Urk. 648 Egypt, in valor, [in victory, in might, in triumph.]
(9) Now it was a [long] time [that they ruled this land which
was in] (10) disturbance. Every man was working for [their
princes who were in Avaris.] (11) It came to pass at a later
time that the garrison which had been there (12) were in the
city of Sharuhen.
They were from Yeraza (13) to the Marshes of the Earth*
2. Sethe would read "his Majesty passed by the fortess of." However, the usual restor-
ation, as I have given it, seems to fill the lacuna as well and agrees with the formula usual through-
out the Annals. For the restoration cf. Rouge, Iriscr. iter. 207.
3. Sethe, "Neue Spuren der Hyksos in Inschriften der 18. Dynastic," ./4Z, p. 73 FT, sup-
ports this restoration of the Urkunden, but the use of the rare word tki'zv, "invaders", seems too
definite to be accepted.
4. Sethe, op. cit., p. 84, translates the passage "von Jrd bis zu den Enden der
Erde". This phrase, "From Yaraza to the Marshes of the Earth," Breasted, Atuierit Records, II,
416, noted, interprets as meaning "from northwestern Judea to beyond the Euphrates." This also
seems to be the meaning given by IVliiller, j4. und E., p. 281 ff. Maspero, Recueil, II, p. 50,
translates the passage " a partir de la ville de leraza, jusqu'aux regions lointaines de la terre".
On the other hand, Hall, Anc. Hist, of the Near East, p. 234, note i, says, "This does
not mean the country from Northwestern fudea to beyond the Euphrates, as Breasted
thinks, but to the Serbonian bog and Lake Menzala. " That the term, "Marshes
of the Earth", was originally applied to the marshes of the Delta is most likely and thus
it came to signify the extreme north as known to the Egyptian of the prehistoric period. As,
however, the Egyptian frontier was pushed over into Asia and geographical knowledge extended,
the old term came to be applie.1 to the Naharin region, which was then the northern Imiit of
Egyptian geography. Hall, on page 234, translates the passage under discussion, "from Yeraza
to the marshes of Egypt", in which lie renders t' as "Egypt", a rather unjustifiable liberty
with the meaning ot the word which prejudges the question. That the term "marshes"
would apply aptly to the plains ot northern Syria, at least in the rainv winter and early summer,
is evident to any traveller who has tried to make his way across the wide stretches of flooded
land around Aleppo at that time of year. "The Marshes of Asia" are constantly referred to in
the historical inscriptions; see /Indent Records, II, 120, 321, 38^, 402; III, 118. Agiin,
"the Marshes of Naharin" occurs in Ancient Records, II, 631, and III, I 18. "Marshes" is
syniinvinoiis wirli Mir.inni in Ancicm Records, II, 659. In Ancient Records, III, 480 we have re-
The Battle of Megiddo 5
when they began to^ revolt against his Majesty. ^
Year 23, first month of the third season, day 4; day of the
feast of the royal coronation; (14) at the city of "Which-the
-prince-seized", Gaza [is its name in Kharu.]'
[Year 23,] (15) first month of the third season, day 5; depar-
ture from this place in valor, [in victory,] (16) in might, in
triumph, to overthrow that wretched foe and to extend (17)
[Jrk. 649 the boundaries of Egypt, according to that which his father,
Amon, commanded (18) he seize.
Year 23, first month of the third season, day 16; at the city
of Yehem.
When Thutmose III at last became sole ruler of Egypt after the death
of his queen Hatshepsut, about 1480 B.C., he found himself confronted
with a dangerous situation in his Asiatic provinces. The remnants of
the Hyksos power, driven from Egypt a hundred years earlier by
Ahmose I, and since brought into subjection to Egypt by Amenhotep I
and Thutmose I, had taken advantage of the military inactivity of
Hatshepsut's supremacy to combine for a last struggle with the ex-
panding power of Egypt.8 The center of the movemen t seems to have
been the King of Kadesh on the Orontes. Under his leadership the dy-
nasts of Syria-Palestine united and their combined forces advanced
ference miide to the "marshlands" (plu) as being the extreme limit of the world, therefore not
of Egypt. Again in Ancient Records, 11, loi, 657; III, 434, "iVIarshes" is clearly used to re-
fer to countries remote from Eiiypt in northern Syria. It is strange if in this passage alone among
historical inscriptions "the Marshes of the Earth" (not "Egypt") should be used of Egypt,
especially when the writer is speaking of a revolt, the center of which was in the north at
Kadesii, and the members of which included "every chief of every northern country." [Urk.
IV, 660, 7).
5. The idiom ■zi;' r in this passage is of uncertain meaning. Breasted, PSBA, 23, 239 ff., sug-
gests the translation "to be about to, to begin". The latest discussion, that in Gardiner, Admo-
nititns, p. 53, suggests that the "notion of a logical development in a wrong direction, is present
in a greater or less degree". In titling der K. P. Akademte, XXXIX, p. 51, Erman gives the
meaning as "sich anschickt-n zu", on the basis of the Berlin Dictionary material. None of these
explanation seems to entirely fit all the cases. I have adopted Erman 's rendition as nearly as pos-
ible, adapting the idea to the exegences of translation where necessary.
6. The translation as given above is based on Sethe's reconstruction, of>. cit., pp, 73-86. The
restoration of such words as "Avaris", however, is altogether too daring to serve as a basis for sei-
entific conclusions. As it does not prejudice in any way the results of the present study, I give the
passage in full.
7. So Sethe. Equals "is its Palestinian name"- a very doubtful restoration.
8. For the latest evidence of the identity of the Asiatic opponants of Thutmose III with the
Hyksos, see Sethe's reconstruction of the text of the Annals, o/>. cit.
6 . The Battle of Megiddo
southward to the Plain of Esdraelon to meet the advance of Thutmose
III who was bent on bringing the rebellious states again under Egyptian
control. In the 22nd year of his reign, on the 25th day of the 8th month
(April 19th, 1479 B.C.), Thutmose marched out of Egypt at the frontier
fortress of Tharu 9 on his eastern border and lead his army towards
Palestine. Just how large his forces were it is impossible to say, though
we may be certain that they comprised not more than 15,000 to 20,000
men, while 10,000 would probably not be underestimating their
numbers. '0 The Asiatics certainly did not outnumber the Egyptians,
and we may therefore place the contending forces at between 10,000
and 15,000 men each. Of these a portion was chariotry and the re-
mainder infantry, armed for the most part with bows and spears. The
sword was as yet almost, if not entirely, unknown in oriental warfare,
probably not coming into use in the East till the introduction of Sherden
mercenaries, who first appear under Amenhotep III."' Each chariot
held two men, the driver and an archer. The Hittites later were accus-
tomed to use three men to a chariot, but we have no evidence that the
Asiatics at this time used more than two men. The effectiveness of the
chariot depended on the skill of the archer and on the demoralization
wrought among the enemy by the charge of the chariots into their
ranks.
On the 4th day of the 9th month (April 28th), Thutmose was in
Gaza, the first important place he met in Palestine. 12 On the 16th of the
month (May 19th) he reached Yehem, where he seems to have come in-
to touch with the enemy for the first time. Just where this city lay is
open to question. It must have been located on the coast plain near the
southern slope of the Carmel Ridge, for, first, it was at or near the junc-
tion of three roads that led across the Ridge into the Plain of Esdraelon,
and the only three roads that thus cross the Ridge meet on the coast
plain at the foot of the Ridge not far from Tellel-Asawir (see Map I); and,
second, it lay so near the Ridge that when the army marched out of
9 For location of Tharu see Kiithmann, Die Ostg'tnze j4e^\ptens, pp. 33-46,
10 For a discussion of the available material on the size of Egyptian armies see Breasted,
Baltic of Kadesh, pp, 8-n.
11 Knudtzon, El-Amarna Tafeln, 122.
12 On the importance of Gaza and its neighborhood from a military standpoint see Olmstead,
Sargon of Auyria, p. 62 ff. Also Hartmann "Die Strasse Von Damaskus nach Kairo"
ZDMG, 64, p. 668.
V
The Battle of Megiddo
^ehen on May 13th, the troops had already assumed the pecuUar forma-
tion necessitated by the mountain defile, 13 but which would have been
entirely unnecessary on the open coast plain. Near the spot where the
three roads meet is located the modern village of Yemma, which Petrie
has identified with Thutmose's halting place.i'* Although the identifica-
tion is little more than guesswork, still Yehem must have lain in the
neighborhood of Yemma, and may be provisionally located near that
spot.
Any army approaching Syria from the south along the coast road
encounters just beyond Yehem the first natural barrier to its advance.
The ridge of hills, shooting off from the highlands of Ephraim, running
from southeast to northwest and terminating at the seaward end in Mt.
Carmel, cuts through the coast plain and offers a natural bulwark of
defence to southern Syria. '^ The Ridge, stretching out for eighteen or
nineteen miles, runs along the southern edge of the Plain of Esdraelon.
It is crossed in two places by roads which apparently have, since the
beginning of history, serves as highways of commerce for the caravans
passing back and forth from Egypt to Mesopotamia. The Ridge itself
falls naturally into two parts, the northern section, which forms Mt.
Carmel, and the southern end, known first as Belad er-Ruhah and
further south as Umm el-Khataf and Umm el-Fahm.'6 The sides of Mt.
Carmel itself rise so steeply from the plain, especially on the north, that
nothing but the roughest and steepest footpath can cross it. At its
highest point it attains an altitude of 1,800 feet, while at its southern
extremity, just above the road from Tell Kaimun to Tell el-Asawir, it
is still some 1,000 feet above the sea. No hostile army, nor indeed peace-
ful caravan, can climb its rocky eastern side. In order to reach the north
of Carmel, an army approaching from the south must either go around
13. Urk., IV, 652.
14. Hist, of Egypt, II, p.327. Cf. Miiller, MVAG, 1907, I,p.22. M»i^ao, Struggle of
the Nations, p. 2 5 7, note I, puts Yehem at el-Kheimeh (following F. de Saulcy). Hall, Arte.
Hist, of the Near East,p. 235, suggests that the town probably lay in the present Wady Yah-
mur, a small wady in the low hills south ot 'Ar'arah.
15. The following description of this region is drawn from my own notes, as well as from
the numerous accounts of this district which have been published by travellers.
16. For lack of any other designation I shall speak of this whole range of hills, including
Carmel, BelSd er-RQhah, Umm el-Fahm and Umm el-Khataf, as the Carmel Ridge, distin-
guishing it thus from Mt. Carmel proper, which forms its northern end.
8 The Battle of Megiddo
the northern end by the site of the modern city of Haifa on the sea, the
road usually followed by the crusading and other armies coming along
the coast plain, or must pass around the southern end either by the road
already referred to, running from Tell el-Asawir to Tell Kaimun, or by
the road through Subbarin and down the Wady Milh to Tell Kaimun.
The remaining two-thirds of the Ridge keeps along at a moderate
height of from 800 to 1,500 feet above the sea level. As seen from
across the Plain of Esdraelon, the northern section of the Ridge ,known as
Belad er-Ruhah, between Carmel proper and Umm el-Fahm, is re-
markably even in height, and is lower than either extremity of the
Ridge. The two roads, to which I later refer as the first road and the
third road, cross the Ridge at either end of this middle section. The
northern side, which abuts directly upon the Plain of Esdraelon, is fairly
steep and rocky and to-day is almost totally devoid of verdure. To the
traveller following the road from Haifa to Jenin along the northern base
of the hills this Ridge presents a most inhospitable and forbidding ap-
pearance. There are to-day only a very few scantily populated villages
between the seaward end of the plain and Tell el-Mutesellim. The in-
habitants of these villages draw their livelihood from the cultivation of
the plain, and there are no signs of vineyards and groves on the hills
themselves. This portion of the Ridge repels any advance of population
from the plain, while its desolate appearance seems to accentuate the
difiRculty of crossing it presented by its barren, rocky slopes.
Between Tell el-Mutesellim and Jenin the hills assume a more pleas-
ing aspect and several fairly prosperous villages are scattered along
their base. But these villages also turn rather towards the plain than
towards the hills, which here rise to a considerable height in the re-
gion of Umm el-Khntaf and Umm el-Fahm.
The southern slope is, for the most part, much more gradual, rising
gently out of the coast plain, and is covered with a fair growth of
trees, the evident remains of much more extensive forests. The water-
shed lies well to the north side of the Ridge, so that, while this line of
hills seems to offer an obstacle to an enemy approaching it from the north,
it, on the other hand, rises so gradually from the plain on the south that,
to a vigorous commander approaching from that direct'on, it ni'ght seem
to present but little impediment to an advance. While several hostile
The Battle of Megiddo 9
armies have crossed the Ridge from south to north,''' few, if any, have
assayed it from north to south. Those invaders from the north who
have not taken the coast road around the northern end of Carmel, have
avoided the dangers of the nari-ow passes by following the more open
and less difficult road around the southern end by Jenin, through the
Plain of 'Arrabeh to Baka or Zeita.
To cross the Ridge two roads start from Tell el-Asawir.'^ The one
runs almost due north to Tell Kaimun, while the second, starting
slightly northeast, bifurcates at 'Ain 'Arah, one branch reaching the
Plain of Esdraelon at Tell el-Aghbarlyeh, and the second branch at Tell
el-Mutesellim. For conveniance of designation and to avoid confusion
I shall speak of these roads as the first roads (Tell Kaimiln to Tell el-
Asawir), the second road (Tell el- Aghbariyeh to 'Ain 'Arah), the third
road (Tell el-Mutesellim to Tell el-Asawir), and the /o«r^/i road (Je-
nin, the Plain of 'Arrabeh to Baka or Zeita). There are one or two rough
paths that cross at other places, serving to connect the various villages
scattered along the Ridge, but none of them shows Evidence of ever hav-
ing been an ancient highway, nor would they offer an opportunity for an
army to cross the hills. A study of Map I will show that these four
roads occupy the only passes over the Ridge, so that, in ancient as in
modern times, they served as the only regular lines of communication
between the coast plain and the Plain of Esdraelon.
The first road, though fairly easy of ascent on the southern slope oi
the Ridge, is yet steep at the northern extremity. It does not connect at
the northern end with any highway to the northeast, but leads rather
into the Phoenician Plain than into the Plain of Esdraelon. '^
For the moment I shall pass over the second road, which debouches in-
to the great plain st Tell el -Aghbariyeh, and shall consider in some de-
17. These include Thutmose III, Pharaoh Necho, and Napoleon. It is interesting, how-
ever, that Napoleon in his retreat kept to the sea road around the northern end of Carmel.
18. Schumacher, "Die Aegyp. Hauptstrasse von der Ebene Sharon zur Ebene Jezreel,"
MuNDPy, 1903, p. 4.
19. There is still another road north of the first loaJ, which, however, is really a branch
oi the first road for it starts from Tell Kaimn and branching off from the main road to the
right, ascends the Wady Milh and so on by Subbarn to the plain. As the northern end ofthis
road reaches Esdra?lon at the same spot as does the first road, for the purpose of this discussion
it may be regarded as offering the same advantages or disadvantages as does the latter road. I have
therefore not taken it up in detail, but consider that the arguments applied to the first road
apply equally well to it.
10 The Battle of Megiddo
tail the third and most important of the roads that cross the Ridge,
that running from Tell el-As^wir to Tell el-Mutesellim.
At the spot where the road from Tell el-Mutesellim and that from
Tell Kaimun meet was once a stronghold, to-dav marked by the con-
siderable mound of Tell el-Asawir, which, together with a possible
settlement on the site of the village of ez-Zebadne^o opposite, controlled
the junction of these two important commercial highways. Starting
from Tell el-Asawir, the road enters the Wady 'Arab, which is there
one half to three quarters of a mile wide and is flat and open. There are
evident traces of an old Roman road that once led through the wady.
About four miles above Tell el-Asawir lies 'Ain 'Arab, the first of se-
veral springs that are scattered along the way (see View I). In fact, be-
tween this point and the outlet of the road near Tell el-Mutesellim, a
distance of about nine miles, there are five or six good springs and wells
and several smaller sources of water. It is by far the best provided in
this respect of any of the roads that cross the Ridge. At 'Ain 'Arab,
where the modern village of 'Arab stands, there was once a fortress
which, with 'Ar'arah on the other side of the wady, commanded the
junction of the road from Tell el- Aghbariyeh with that from Tell el-
Mutesellim. Up to, and i slightly beyond, the point where this road
branches off, the wady remains open to a width of from a third to half a
mile and with its excellent water supply offers abundant camping
ground for an army of ten or fifteen thousand men preparing to cross
the Ridge by either of the two roads (see View II). In fact, all the way
from Tell el-Asawir to a quarter of a mile above 'Ar'arah the valley is
wide and level and is even cultivated some way up the slopes on either
hand. In the spring of the year — the season at which I crossed this pass
— when the grain is yet green, the prospect that meets the traveller's
eye as he enters this wady is most pleasing. The ascent, moreover, is
so gradual as to be scarcely perceptible and it is possible to drive a car-
20. Also apparently known locally as Wady 'Arab
21. This Tell is generally so designated both on the English Survey Map and in accounts
of the region. Schumacher, MuNDPf^, 1903, p. 5, in a very careful and detailed account of
the region, speaks of it as "Tell es-Samra." There is undoubtedly a "Shirbet es-Samra" at that
point, buf my own inquiries in the neighborhood as to the name of the Tell seemed to show no
unanimity of opinion on the part of the inhabitants of the district. 1 have therefore adhered to
the name Tell el-Asiwir
The Battle of Megiddo . 11
riage even as far as the top of the pass at Ain Ibrahim. 22 The latter part
of the ascent, from above 'Ain 'Arab to the head of the pass, is more
narrow, contracting in places to a hundred yards or so. Just before the
top is reached, a rough donkey-path turns off to the right and winds up
the hillside to the village of Umni el-Fahm, a notorious haunt of highway-
men, which nestles above in a theatre of hills opening to the northwegt.
The top of the pass near Ain Ibrahim is about 1,200 feet above the
sea, making a total rise from 'Ain 'Arab of only about 750 feet in approx-
imately six miles. Throughout its length at intervals appear remains
of the ancient Roman road, with here and there a milestone either in situ
or lying nei^r by. At 'Ain Ibrahim the valley opens out to two hundred
yards or so, as if to offer a halting place to the caravans before they
enter upon the more abrupt descent on the northern side of the Ridge
From the top of the pass the road gradually descends, passing the vil-
lage of Masmiis and winding about among the hills (see View III). It
continues to decline for about a mile and a half, sinking some three hun-
dred feet below the top of the pass. At this point the main valley turns
to the right and reaches the plain a little to the south of Megiddo. It,
however, is exceedingly narrow and rough and from its very formation
could never have been used as a road, a conclusion which is strengthen-
ed by the fact that its opening is not marked by any settlement. When
the road reaches the point where the valley makes this sudden turn, it
continues straight on up a slight rise of about a hundred feet and then
descends alonga smaller wady (see View IV). This latter gradually con-
tracts as it proceeds till, about half a mile above the mouth of the val-
ley, it reaches its narrowest point, being not more than ten yards wide.
A little further on the road takes a sudden turn and, opening out rapid-
ly to a couple of hundred yards, it emerges upon the plain of Lejjun
(see View- V). The opening of the valley is of sufficient width to allow
a body of several thousand troops to assemble within it without having
to overflow into the plain beyond. The road from 'Ain Ibrahim to the
opening of the valley is about three miles long and descends within that
distance some six hundred and fifty feet, so that the descent on the
north side is much steeper than is the ascent on the other side of the
Ridge. Throughout the ascent on the south the road runs along the floor
22. I myself have gone by carriage to nearly a mile above 'Ar'arah.
12 The Battle of Megiddo
of the wady which is almost level (see View II). On the north of 'Ain
Ibrahim, however, it is narrower and the bottom is therefore worn by
the winter torrents which make it impassable as a road bed. The road
here keeps some fifty feet up the slope on the west side of the wady,
and for this reason is much rougher and narrower, not being capable in
many places of accommodating more than two travellers abreast. The
contrast between the ascent on the south and the descent on the north
is therefore marked. The hills on either side slope down gradually to-
wards the bottom of the valley (see View III). Of course such a road
could be easily defended by a comparatively small number of men, but,
on the other hand, an invading army could readily keep possession of
the hills on either hand which are neither steep nor high above the
valley. Nowhere, till a few hundred yards from the mouth of the pass,
can a sight of Tell el-Mutesellim or its immediate surroundings be ob-
tained by any one descending from 'Ain Ibrahim, though a watcher
posted on the hill above Lejjun could descry an approaching army at
least a mile above the mouth of the pass.
The second road, thatw^hich runs from 'Ain 'Arab to Tell ol-Aghbari-
yeh, is a more difficult and less used road than the one to Tell el-Mutesel-
lim. It is merely a rough mule-path totally different from the third
road with which it connects. It rises "400 feet in 5 miles towards the
watershed of Belad er-Ruhah. It passes by the old ruined Khan of el-
Mawiyeh and through Kefrein, descending thence some 500 feet in
3 miles"23 and reaches the plain at Tell el-Aghbariyeh. It was once
perhaps the main line to Nazareth, but has been abandoned, as it cross-
es the Kishon at a spot where there are some dangerous pools. It now
serves principally for the villages along its course.
Around the southern end of the Carmel Ridge runs the fourth road
from ez-Zeita to Jenin by way of the Plain of 'Arrabeh, which through-
out the history of this region has served as an alternate route with that
starting from Tell el-Mutesellim for the caravans coming down from
Damascus to the coast plain. 24 This road is less shut in than are those
through the heart of the Ridge, and to an invading army desirous of
reaching the Plain of Esdraelon, it offers a more secure passage. Only on
23. Suifey of fVeitern FaJestine, 11, p 50.
24. Hartmann, ZDMG, 64, pp. 665 ff.
The Battle of Megtddo 13
one side do the hills threaten the road. It enters the hills by the Wady
el-Ghamik and then passes along the Plain of 'Arrabeh near Dothan,
descending by the Wady Belameh to Jenin. The highest point is only
800 feet above sea level and the steepest gradient extends over about four
miles of the way, where the rise is less than 100 feet per mile. In winter
this is the usual road for travellers on horseback, as the third road where
it crosses Esdraelon is impassable in winter. ^s
Skirting the southern edge of the Plain of Esdrtelon under the shadow
of the Ridge itself runs an old road that has served to connect the cities
on the southern edge of the plain. Along its course it cuts through the
various roads that cross the plain. At each such junction there stood in
ancient times a fortified city, which thus guarded the entrance to its
respective pass and controlled the commerce passing along the road. The
entrance to the first road was guarded by the city that stood on Tell
Keimiin. This spot probably marks the site of Jokneam26 and by its
relations both to the mountain pass and to the opening of the Plain of
Esdraelon towards Acre must have early risen to considerable import-
ance. At the mouth of the second road lies Tell el-Aghbariyeh,27 once
the site of an ancient stronghold. Tell el-Mutesellim, the spot where
Megiddooncestood,28 guards the entrance to the third road. Later this
site was abandoned in favor of Lejjun, about a mile away, directly at
the mouth of the pass through which the third road crosses the Ridge.
25. SurirY of fVeitern Palestine, II. p. 50.
26. Robinson, Later Bib. Resean/ies, p. 114. Eric. Bib under Jokneam. Swz'ey 0/
ff^estern Palatine, II, 48, says that it was "possibly the Cyamon of Judith (VII 3). The
place is mentioned under it< modern name in the Samaritan Book of Joshua. John of Wirtz-
burg (iioo) calls it Cain Mens, 8 miles from Nazareth, near Carmel; iMarino Sanuto ( 1321)
says that Cain was here killed by an arrow by Lamech, and marks the place on his map in the
position of Keimun. Tetellus (1130) makes Kains Mons 10 miles from Acre, 3 miles from
Carmel, and speaks of a fountain at its foot where Cain was killed. In the 'Onomasticon' it is
called Cimona, and placed 6 Roman miles from Legio, on the way to Ptolemais." During the
Crusades the fortress of Caymont occupied this site, and formed the center of one of the smaller
Latin fiefs.
27. Dr. E. Graf von Miilinen, MuNDPV, 1908, p. 40, states that at this spot are two
groups of houses which' are called "gliubajja" which the Survey Map erroneously calls "aghba-
riyeh."
28. G. A. Smith, Hist. Geog., pp. 386 ff., gives the evidence for the identification of the
location of Megiddo as follows: "At the base of the central plain, just opposite Jezreel, is a place
called Leijun — the Roman Legio, Legion, at the mouth of the chief pass towards Sharon. It
was, therefore, as important a site as Jezreel, and as likely to give its name to the plain. In
Roman times it did so. Jerome calls the great plain both the Plains of Megiddo and the Campus
Legionis. Moreover the only town definitely named in the immediafe neighborhood of Megiddo
Taanach upon the waters of Megiddo— is undoubtedly the present Tannuk, four miles from
14 The Battle of Megiddo
Thf fniirffi road, round the southern end of the hills, was controlled by
Jezreel and to a certain extent by Taanach. The size of the tells that
mark this line of cities testifies to the importance that their location gave
them in ancient times. This whole road is also abundantly supplied
with water.
At Tell el-Mutesellim the Carmel Ridge suddenly recedes from the
plain, forming a great bay or indentation in the hills about a mile deep
and a mile and a half wide. The center of this bay is occupied by a group
ofmounds^^on the highest point of which stands the Tell (see View VI).
Between the mounds, marked G, H ,1 on Map II, and the foothills enclos-
ing the bay is a narrow stretch of flat, cultivated land which thus se-
parates the mounds, of which the Tell forms a part, from the main
Ridge (see View VII).
To the north and east of the Tell extends the Plain of Esdra^lon,
gradually sloping away from the Ridge to the Kishon in the midst
of the plain. The site of the city projects slightly beyond the line of the
Carmel Ridge, Megiddo enjoying thereby one of the most commanding
positions in Palestine. ^o The whole plain lay stretched out before the
inhabitants of the city, who thus obtained a sight of all who passed
along the roads across the plain.
The low foothills. A, B, C, D and E, which enclose the bay, rise to an
average height of about two or three hundred feet above the cultivated
land at their base. With the exception of B, which is lava, they are of
Lejjun ; and there even seems a trace or the name in the name the Arabs give to Kishon, the
Muqutta. Omitting this last item, we have enough of evidence to support Robinson's identifica-
tion ot Lejjun with Megiddo, even against the plausible rival which Major Condor has favored
in MuiedJa', a site with considerable ruins at the foot of Gilboa, above Jordan and near Beisan."
To this evidence may be added that from the Annals of Thutmose III in which, as Breasted,
Ancient Records, II, 426, note d, points out, the Asiatic army, which fights a battle before
Megiddo, has its south wing at Taanach 5 hence Megiddo must have lain not far to the north
of Taanach. The city also lay near the opening of the middle one of three roads that cross the Ridge,
the southernmost of which came out near Taanach. I have already shown where, according to
the conformation of the country, this road must have lain, and just at the mouth of the middle
road is Tell el-Mutesellim. For a refutation of Condor's identification see G. A. Smith, Hin.
Geog., p. 887, note.
29. I have here used the term "mound" to distinguish these three elevations from the
"hills" behind them and from the "knoll" F. They are, of course, not artificial mounds but
natural elevations.
30. Hall, y4nc. Hist, ef the h'ear East, p. 235, erroneously states that "both towns"
( Meg'ddo and Taanach) "stand back behind the ridge halfwav down to the pain." In walk-
ing across Esdraeion from Megiddo to Nazareth, 1 have been impressed with the remarkable s^te
that Megiddo occupied, the Tell forming one of the most conspiruous features of the Ian. scape.
The Battle of Megiddo 15
limestone formation, to-day totally devoid of trees and covered with a
scant growth of thorns and bunch grass. The limestone is laid bare
here and there on their sides, which form a succession of rough ledges
where the scanty soil has been washed away by the heavy winter rains
(see View IX). If these hills were ever under cultivation, all traces of
it have entirely disappeared. Their sides are of moderate steepness, ris-
ing at an angle of 15" to 20'. At the point marked K there is a break
in the encircling hills, the cultivated land extending into the gap for
some distance till it gradually terminates in rocky land as the hills a-
gain approach the plain. Beyond the gap K the enclosing hills terminate
in an isolated knoll, marked F on Map II, which rises only about seven-
ty-five or a hundred feet above the surrounding land. This knoll is also
of limestone formation, though the slopes are not quite so rocky as are
those of the foothills just described (see View V).
Between the hills A and B, and B and C the wadies are small and run
back for only a short distance till they are lost in the hills be'hind. Be-
tween C and D is a wide opening known as Wady es-Sitt, receding for
some two miles into the range (see View X). At the head of this
wady is a perennial spring, 'Ain es-Sitt, of considerable size, the stream
which 1 have identified with the Brook Kina of the Egyptian sources
(see Map II). Between hills D and E is the opening of the pass over the
Ridge along which the Egyptian army advanced on Megiddo. The culti-
vated land lying between these foothills and the group of mounds G, H,
and I, on which Megiddo stood, is flat and free from large stones. At
the northern end opposite Megiddo this strip is about a fifth of a mile
wide, gradually broadening as it sweeps around to the south and east
till opposite the mouth of the pass it attains a width of about half a
mile (see View VII). Across this strip of land the Kina has cut a chan-
nel, ranging from two to three feet deep at the opening of the Wady es-
Sitt, marked "a" on Map II, to fifteen or eighteen feet deep at the point
"b" and beyond (See ViewXI). After crossing the cultivated land the
brook turns at right angles and runs along the edge of the mounds H and
I, turning again so as to flow between the mound I and the knoll F, till it
enters the plain of Esdraelon. The channel of the stream is uniformly fif-
teen to twenty feet below the bank on either hand. These banks are fair-
ly steep and continue so till they fall away gradually, so that at "c" it is
16 The Battle of Megiddo
possible for the road to Taanach to cross the stream with only a slight
descent of three or four feet. At "b" a road crosses the stream by a steep
descent, while at "d" there is a bridge.
The two mounds G and H, together with the Tell, are really one,
though they are separated by slight depressions. The Tell is the high-
est part of the group, being 125 feet above 'Ain el-Kubbi at its northern
base. The mound G is slightly lower, averaging about one hundred feet
above the 'Ain. Between the two is a narrow cut or trench, possibly
partly artificial, having been dug out as a sort of dry moat to render the
the city less accessible on that side, but partly caused by the gradual
rising of the Tell from age to age, as city after city was bviilt and de-
stroyed on its site. This depression is some thirty feet deep. The sur-
face of mound G is level, except for the ruins of Graeco-Roman struc-
tures with which it is to-day encumbered. Between G and H there is
only a slight depression of a few feet. The surface of H is also covered
with remains of late buildings and is, moreover, by nature not so level
as is G. Between the two mounds G and H and the mound I there is a
considerable depression through which at present a road runs. I is much
lower than H, rising not more than forty to fifty feet above ' Ainel-
Kubbi. Its surface is level.
The sides of the Tell slope sharply to the plain on either hand, run-
ning down at about an angle of 30° in many places (see View XII). The
sides of the mounds G, H, and I are much more gradual for the most
part, except on the side where H borders on the brook Kina, at which
place the land descends more abruptly to the bed of the stream. On the
west of these mounds the ascent is gradual (see View XIII), so much so
that a wheeled vehicle could with ease drive on to the mounds from that
side. The north side of the Tell descends to a sort of terrace raised some
feet above the plain beyond. Just below this terrace is the spring, 'Ain
el-Kubbi, which in ancient times supplied the inhabitants of Megiddo
with water.
Along the east side of the Tell runs the road spoken of on page 13 as
cf)nnecting the line of cities which guarded the series of crossroads on
the northern side of the Carmel Ridge. From, or across, this road at
the points marked e, f, g, h, and i, run other roads all of which con-
verge on the mouth of the pass leading over the Ridge south of the
The Battle of Megiddo 17
city. No better evidence of the importance of this same pass could be of-
fered than the presence of these five roads all leading into this one valley.
At about the time of Thutmose Ill's campaign Megiddo was a strong-
ly fortified place. Its defences consisted of a massive brick wall enclos-
ing an area roughly oval in shape, some three hundred and fifteen me-
ters long by two hundred and thirty meters wide. 31 The wall, supported
by buttresses at intervals, was about ten meters high and six meters
thick, protected especially on the south and west against the driving of
the winter rains by a projecting glacis. There is no evidence of a moat
around the city, though on the south the Tell is separated from the
mound G by the depression already spoken of. The excavations have dis-
closed only two gates, one on the south and one on the north, -^2 though there
were probably others as yet undiscovered. The city's natural defences were
weakest on the south and west, where the height of the Tell above
the plain is much less than on the east and north. This may in part ac-
count for the fact that the projecting glacis along the foot of the wall is
broadest on those sides, thus rendering it more difficult to scale the
wall with ladders. 33
Megiddo makes its advent into history with the first campaign of
Thutmose III. That its story runs far back of any written record is
certain, not only from the evidence of neolithic settlement on the site
which the excavation of the Tell has disclosed, 34 bvit also because we
cannot suppose that a situation so favorable to human habitation would
not have been early occupied. Its abundant water supply, 35 its isolated
position rendering it easily defensible on all sides, its close relation to
the rich plain of Esdraelon, and finally, when commerce had developed,
its command of the natural highway from Mesopotamia to Egypt,
would all offer unusual inducements to the growth of a large and flourish-
ing settlement. However, its situation on the great artery of commerce
was the most determining factor.38 In the early world, after trade be-
31. Schumacher, Tell el-Muteiellim, 1, p. 23 fF.
31. Schumachrr, op. cie., I, p. 77 ft", and p. 47
33. Ci. Holscher, Holies Tor fori Mcdiriet Hahu, p 63.
34. Schumacher, op cit., I, p. 11 ft.
35. The K.ina, which flows by the Tell, is the most considerable aftluent of the Kishon on
the south.
36. This was the road across the Ridge mentioned in the Tabula Peutingeriana and was
in Arab times, except during the supremacy of the Crusaders, the regular way tor the caravans
18 The Battle of Megiddo
tween Egypt and the north had taken extensively to the land route,
such cities undoubtedly collected heavy toll from the passing caravans
of merchants, much as did the feudal barons of the Middle Ages.
Not only did Megiddo command the great route from Mesopotamia,
but it also lay on the road connecting the Phoenician Plain with the hills
of Ephraim and Judah. The commerce which sought these highlands
came down from the coast cities and, turning inland after it left Acre,
passed through the narrow gap at the northern end of Esdraelon, along
the base of the Carmel Ridge, by Megiddo and Taanach, and on to Sa-
maria and Jerusalem. 37 While these trade routes flourished, Megiddo
or its successor Legio (modern Lejjun), were prominent cities, but when
commerce lapsed or was diverted elsewhere, they sank into insignifi-
cance.
But the military significance of Megiddo was not less marked than
was its commercial importance. The Carmel Ridge, cutting through
the coast plain to the very shore of the sea, stands like a rampart
erected against an attack on Syria from the south. All south of Carmel
is the level, uninterrupted coast plain, stretching into the Sinaitic desert
south of Gaza. From this latter point to the boundaries of Egypt is des-
ert save for the few wells or springs at intervals along the road. The
Egyptian invader of Syria has met opposition between the Delta and
Carmel only at one point, the neighborhood of Gaza,^^ where the des-
ert meets the fertile land of the Philistine Plain. Did the Egyptian en-
counter defeat at this point, he found himself in a dangerous situation
indeed, with only the desert road behind him and no refuge from a pur-
suing foe till the frontier forts at Tharu were reached. Thus any cam-
paign that aimed at gaining the Plain of Esdraelon fell naturally into
three movements: first, the advance to Gaza; second, the advance along
the Philistine Plain; and third, the crossing of the Carmel Ridge.
In the Annals these natural stages in the campaign have been noted,
showing that already the military commanders of the day conducted no
haphazzard warfare, but took into account the larger problems of
from Damascus to Cairo. See Hartmann, "Die Strasse voii Damaskus nach Kairo," ZDMG,
64, p. 665 ff.
37. This was the route frequently followed by the Assyrian armies, and liter by the pil-
grims of the Middle Ages.
38. G. A. Smith, Hist. Geog., p. 184. Olmstead, Stirgon of Assy ia, p. 54.
The Battle of Megiddo 19
military tactics, and were fully aware of the importance in the successful
manipulation of troops attached to an accurate knowledge of the topog-
raphy of the field of operations.^^ The Egyptian wars of liberation had
developed the first known school of military experts at all commen-
surable with modern army boards.
Why the Allies did not meet Thutmose's advance in the neighborhood
of Gaza is not entirely clear. For one thing, such a move would have
taken them far from their northern base of operations. Moreover, the
south seems to have been either friendly, or, at most, not actively hos-
til, to the Egyptians. The fact that the list of the cities said to have been
"captured" on the first campaign^o includes the names of many towns
in southern Palestine, would not weigh heavily against this view, when
we take into consideration the evident fact that, in all the lists of con-
quered cities, any places of importance included within the field of ope-
rations were regularly enumerated, whether they had been loyal to the
Pharaoh or had rebelled.
Suffice it to say that, having failed to seize the first natural point of
resistance to the Egyptians, the King of Kadesh took up his position
at the next natural rampart, the Carmel Ridge. There he could secure
the most advantageous position for repulsing the invaders. That, having
shown his appreciation of the strength of this position by deliberately
taking his stand at Megiddo, he should then have thrown away the ad-
vantage afforded by the narrowness of the mountain pass through which
Thutmose was compelled to move, is as remarkable as it is inexplica-
ble.*' At any rate the Allies permitted Thutmose to accomplish the first
two movements of the campaign, the march to Gaza and thence to the
■59. The Anridlsgive in connection with this campaign the dates of the foUowin gevents:
(i) the departure from Tharu, (2) the arrival at Gaza, (3) the departure from Gaza, (4)
the arrival at Yehem, (5) the departure from 'Aruna, (6) the Battle of Megiddo. The first
two dates mark the first stage of the campaign; the s-cond two, the second stage; and the last
two, tlie third stage.
40. U'k, IV, pp. jjg--ji6.
41. The military importance of this road is evident from the fact that the Romans placed a
strong force at the northern end, at Legio, modern Lejjun, the actual camp itself probably oc-
cupying the knoll marked F on Map II. Cf. Schumacher, Te// el-Mutesellim, I, p 88. G.A.
Smith, Hist. Geog., p. 389, calls attention to the frequent occurance of the names Bethshan,
Taanach, Megiddo, Dor, as marking a line of fortresses "on the one great avenue across coun-
try", and refers to Josh, xxvi, ll: Judges i, 27: I Kings iv. 12: I Chron. vii, 29. These
cities were all strong fortresses and held out against the Hebrew attempts at conquest, remaining
Canaanite till late in their history.
20 The Battle of Megiddo
Carmel Ridge, without opposition, nor do they seem in any way to have
taken advantage of the difficulties the Egyptians encountered in accom-
plishing the third movement to strike Thutmose under circumstances so
favorable to the success of the Allies. Our meager sources must
leave us forever ignorant of the reasons of the Allies for thus throwing
away their greatest chance of victory.
The Battle of Megiddo 21
II
THE PROBLEM OF THE CARMEL RTDGE
THE ANNALS, LINES 18-49
Urk.649 [ His Majesty J commanded (19) to counsil together with liis
victorious army, saying, "Now that [wretched] enemy (20) of
Kedesh, having come and having entered into Megiddo, he is
[there] (21) at this moment. He has assembled to himself the
chiefs of [ all ] the countries [which were] (22) subject to
Egypt as far as Naharin, consisting of (23) the
Kharu, the Kode, their troops, [their peopIe;](24) for he says, it is
reported, 'I am ready to [fight against his Majesty here] (25) in
Megiddo'. Tell ye me [that which is in your hearts."]
(26) They said in the presence of his Majesty, "How is it
possible to march **2 upon(27)this road which becomes narrower?
It is [reported] (28) saying, 'The enemy are there, ready upon
Urk. 650 [the outside,43 and they are] (29) becoming numerous.' Will not
horse go behind [horse, the troops] (30) and the people like-
wise? Shall our vanguard be (31) fighting, while the [rear-
guard] is yet standing (32) in 'Aruna, without their having
fought? Now there are still two roads. (33) One road, behold
it is our '*'' it comes out at (34) Taanach.
42. Lit. "It is like what to go upon this road?"
43. So Sethe's restoration, probably taken from Urk. IV, 655, 5, where it undoubtedly
refers to the king waiting at the mouth of the pass. This restoration would then suppose that
the mejSengers report the enemy to be assembled at the pass "outside" the valley or the moun-
tains. Breasted, Ancient Records, II, 421, restores "holding the way against a multitude" which
would seem to fill the lacuna as well as Sethe's as far as the hieroglyphics are concerned, though
the report of the massengers would not then agree with the situation as disclosed on the king's
arrival at the mouth ot the pass.
44. Sethe restores, "Behold it is excellent for our lord". Hall, Anc. Hist, of the Near
East, p. 236, gives "there is that one which is best for us". Breasted, Ancient Records, II,
22 The Battle of Megiddo
The other, behold it is at the (35) north side^s of Zefti, so that
we shall come out at the north of Megiddo. (36) Let our vic-
torious lord proceed according to the de[sign of] his heart there-
in, (37) but do not cause us to march upon this impassable
road." Then [were brought] (38) massages concerning [that
wretched] foe. [Then was reported the information ?] con-
cerning [this] matter (39) which they had mentioned before.
Urk. 651 Spoken in the Majesty of the Court, L.P.H. "I [swear] (40)
as Re loves me, as my father Amon favors me, as my nostrils
are renewed (41) with satisfying life, my Majesty proceeds
upon this 'Aruna road. (42) Let him whose desire it is among
you march along these (43) roads you have mentioned. Let
him whose desire it is among you go (44) in the following of
my Majesty. Do not let them think among these (45) enemies
whom Re detests, 'Does his Majesty proceed upon (46) another
road (because) he is beginning to fear us?' (So) they will
think." (47) They said in the presence of his Majesty; "May
thy father Amon, Lord of Thebes, Presider over Karnak, do
[according to thy desire.] (48) Behold us as the following of thy
Majesty in whatever place [thy Majesty] proceeds. (49) The
servant is at the back of [his] lord."
Having arrived at Yehem, somewhere on the south of the Carmel
Ridge, Thutmose halted long enough to hold a council of war, as the
Annals puts it, with "his troops". The messengers which appear later
in the account, were undoubtedly spies who had been sent ahead by the
Pharaoh to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy. In all probability
it was their return with the news of the preparation made by the Allies
on the north of the Ridge to check the Egyptian advance that led the
Pharaoh to call the council. There will certainly have been frequent
conferences between the Pharoah and his officers. The j^riestly scribe
421, gives, "one road, behold, it will us". Mnspcro, Recieil, II, p.<;i, gives, "un
chemin voici qu'il nous mettra sur la grande route a I'Ouest de Taanaka". The remarkable thing
about this passage is that on it several historians have based a srateme 't that the officers advocated
one of the roads in preference to the other, when, as a matter of fact, we do not know what
they said of the Taanach road, owing to the lacuna, while th -y certainly did not sav that the
Zetti rond was preferable.
45. Or, "at the road north of Zefti". This, however, is improbable, as the Annalist
never elsewhere uses w'-r of "road" but prefers tnni instead.
The Battle of Megiddo 23
who made these excerpts from the daily records of the campaign gives
us such full details of this particular council because of the importance
of its decisions on subsequent events, but chiefly because it brings out
prominently the fearlessness of the king in contrast to the cautious
nature of his officers. Like many oriental military records the doings of
subordinates are introduced only as a foil to the overshadowing figure
of the monarch.
The king opens the conference by laying before his officers the infor-
mation received: first, that the King of Kadesh has already occupied
Megiddo; second, that he is at the head of a strong coalition reaching as
far as Naharin in the north; and, third, that he is preparing to make a
stand at Megiddo against the Egyptian army. In view of this situation
the king asks the advice of his officers as to how to proceed. Such is the
brief account given in the Annals of the drift of the royal speech. How-
ever, as the officers at once begin to object to the advance by the direct
road, we must suppose that the king had already pointed out this road
as the one he intended to take.
Upon hearing the royal decision the officers seem to have been dismay-
ed, though we may be sure that their consternation has suffered no
diminution at the pen of the royal secretary, who would seek thereby
to enhance h"s master's own reputation for daring. The interrogative
form of their reply (lit. "It is like what to go upon this road which be-
comes narrower?"), trembles with their surprise and fear. They at once
raise the objection that the spies have brought information to the effect
that the enemy are waiting just outside the pass the king has chosen
and that they are, in all probability, very numerous, or, if we accept
Breasted's restoration,"*^ they are making great preparations to dispute
this very road with the Egyptians. Besides, the officers declare, the road
is too narrow to allow of any military formation being maintained.'*''
The army will be strung out in such a long, thin line that the advance
guard will already have come in contact with the enemy before the
46. Ancient Records, II, 421.
47. An interesting commentary on this statement is the passage from Judith, iv, 6-7; "Also
Joacim the high priest, which was in those days in Jerusalem, wrote to them that dwelt in Be-
thulia and Betomestham, which is over against Esdraslon, towards the open country, near to Do-
thaim, charging them to keep the passages of the hill country: for bv them there was an entrance
into Jud-a, and it was easy to stop them that would come up, because the passage was strait, for
two men at most", or, as a variant lias it, "as they came up, the pass being narrow, in double
24 The Battle of Megiddo
rear guard has left 'Aruna. As alternative routes they suggest two
other roads, "^8 one of which issues from the mountains in the direction
of Taanach, and the other of which, passing on the north of Zefti, issues
to the north of Megiddo. "^^ The royal wrath at this objection to the
'Aruna road was probably apparent by this time, for the officers close
their advice by acknowledging the supremacy of the Pharaoh's will, but
still they beg that he will not choose the difficult mountain pass. In sup-
port of their request they further submit the report of the spies to which
they had already referred.
The situation in which the Egyptian army now found itself is evident
from the foregoing account of the progress of the council. It is apparent
that the halt was made at Yehem, because, in view of the report of the
spies, it was necessary for those in charge of the campaign to decide how
the Ridge, lying between them and the enemy, was to be crossed, ^ehem
lay at, or near, the junction of three well-known roads, and it now be-
file at most." The actual character of this pass is an interesting illustration of the meaning ot the
Egyptian phrase iv^ r, the various suggestions in regard to the meaning ot which I have men-
tioned in note 5. As the traveller advances along the road, he is impressed by the fact that the
wady becomes steadily narrower (seepages 10-12) thus conforming to the idea of a gradual
change of condition for the worse, which seems to underlie the Egyptian idiom.
48. Maspero, Struggle of the Nations, p. 256, states that the officers of the king advised
Thutmose to follow the road that ran to the north ot Zefti. There is no evidence for this state-
ment in the Annals, as they specifically st.ite that two roads were suggested, either of which were
acceptable to the generals. Budge, Hiit. of Egypt, IV, p 32, makes the statement that "of
three roads that lead to Megiddo, two were rejected by the generals as unsuitable, but the king
decided to march there by one of them.'" There is a break in the inscription at this point where
Sethe restores "One road, behold it '\s excellent for our lord; it comes out at Taanach." The
surviving portions of the Annals, however, contain nothing to indicate that any preference was
expressed by the officers.
49. Maspero, Struggle of the Nations, p. 257, note I, (as mentioned on p. 7, note 14)
locates Yehem at el-Kheimeh and indentifies Zefti with Saffa, about halt way between Jerusalem
and Jaffa. He says, "The third road ran north of Zatiti, to meet the great highway that cuts
the hill district of Nablus, skirting the foot of Tabor near Jenin, a little to the north of Megid-
do." There are certain objections to this identification. In the first place, it is difficult to see
why it should have taken the Egyptians from the fifth to the sixteenth of the month to cover
tlie short distance from Gaza to Satfa, something less than fifty miles, while for the next fifty
miles, from SafFa to the Carmel Ridge, they required only from the sixteenth to the nineteenth.
The second fifty miles will also have been through the more hostile portion of the country where
one would expect the progress to have been slower. In the second place, the road by Taanach,
which was suggested as an alternate route to the one north of Zefti, would enter the Plain
of Esdrjelon at almost exactly the same spot as the road from Nablus to Jenin and the latter roaii
would therefore otter no advantages over the Taanach road for an armv operating agrinst
Megiddo. Moreover, one fails to see why 'he officers should have desired to take a road which
skirted "the foot of Tabor near Jenin", coming out on the nortii of .VIegiddo, when they
would thereby expose their line of communication with the south to the attack of the enemy,
and would also have to march across the whole width of Esdra'lon only to inaich back again to
Megiddo.
The Battle of Megiddo 25
came necessary, before advancing further, to decide upon one of these
roads as the route to be pursued.'*^ The king favored the one known as
the 'Aruna road, which we learn from the later developments of
the campaign, issued from the mountains at Megiddo. It is described as
being very narrow and difficult, but in this matter due allowance must
be made for exaggeration on the part of the officers who desired to avoid
it and who would naturally paint its disadvantages in the most lurid
hues. That this road crossed the Ridge between the two roads which the
officers favored is also evident, for one of these latter roads entered the
plain towards Taanach, which is to the south of Megiddo, and the other
road is specifically stated to have issued from the mountains north of
Megiddo.
That the Pharaoh's officers were familiar with the country before
them is evident. Possibly the spies who had been sent forward to re-
connoitre had brought back information in regard to these mountain
passes, though the campaigns and commerce of the preceding century
must also have made the Egyptians fully acquainted with the roads of
Palestine-Syria, especially with the great route to and from the Eu-
phrates. This same road across the Carmel Ridge apparently did not
enjoy a very savory reputation among the Egyptians. It is probably
that described in Papyrus Anastasi 1, where its dangers and difficulties
are dwelt on with a wealth of harrowing detail, including wild men of
more than human ferocity, and deep gorges such as are scarcely found in
Palestine at all and certainly not in the region of Megiddo. ^o This des-
cription of the famous road cannot be taken seriously. It is in the gen-
eral tone of the rest of this remarkable papyrus, exaggerated and dis-
torted beyond all measure wherever the writer is describing the utter
incompetency and cowardice of the "Maher", and designed through-
out to exhibit the writer's erudition and knowledge of strange words
and names. Although, of course, the papyrus dates from several hund-
49. For a discussion of the historical importance of these passes see G. A. Smith, Hist.
Geog., p. I 50 fF.
50. Gardiner, Hieratic Texts, I, pp. 25-27: "Beliold tlie is in a ravine two thousand
cubits deep, filled with boulders and pebbles. ******* The (.') narrow defile is
infested (.') with Shosu concealed beneath the bushes; some of them are of four cubits, or of
five cubits, from head (.') to foot {>), fierce of face, their heart is not mild, and they hearken
not to coaxing. *********** Thy path is filled with boulders and pebbles,
without a passable track {}) overgrown with reeds and brambles, briers and wolf-pads. The
ravine is on one side of thee, the mountain rises on the other."
26 The Battle of Megiddo
red years after the Megiddo campaign, s' it still serves to show that the
road was regarded as rough and dangerous, even w^hen Syria was far
better know to the Egyptians than in Thutmose's day.
Roads, especially where they are not paved, shift from age to age. In
the Orient this is especially true of the roads that traverse the plains.
New paths are constantly being made, their direction being governed
largely by the rise or fall of towns and by shifts in the trend of com-
merce.^^ One has only to note the Roman roads, remains of which still
survive throughout Syria and Palestine but so many of which no longer
mark lines of travel, to note how impossible it is to dogmatize on the
location of an ancient road from data furnished by modern roads. In
mountainous regions, however, we have data on which to base a con-
clusion in regard to the location of an ancient road that do not exist in
the case of more level country. We can rest assured that in ancient, as
in classical, mediaeval and modei'n times, roads which crossed moimtain
ranges followed the courses marked out by nature, the passes which still
exist to-day. When, therefore, w^e look for the roads which Thutmose's
council discussed and which crossed the Carmel Ridge, we can turn to
the map of the country as it is to-day and feel assured that from it
we can learn with reasonable certainty the possible routes by which the
Ridge would have been crossed in antiquity. That there was no road,
other than a rough donkey-path, over the southern end of Umm el-
Fahm is obvious from any careful study of the map. Or that any army
wishing to go from the coast plain by the most direct road to Megiddo
should choose any other route than that by the Wady 'Arah is difficult
to conceive. Any other course would have necessitated the scaling of a
succession of rough hills, a most fatiguing and unnecessary labor, when
right at hand lay a direct and easy course along the bottom of the wady
which led directly to the desired goal. In the preceding description of
the Carmel Ridge, I have pointed out the fact that all the passes of the
mountain are occupied to-day by roads. Therefore, in discussing the
situation that now confronted Thutmose, I shall take it for granted that
the roads considered by the council of war were essentially the same, as
far as location goes, with those that cross the Ridge to-day and the his-
51. Gardiner, op. cit., p. I .
52. Cf. Ramsey, Hist. Geo^. of Asia Minor, p. 83.
The Battle of Megiddo 27
tory of which we can trace back to Roman times in the remains of the
paving still in situ.
A glance at Map I will show the road the king advocated. The
road can be none other than the one running from Tell el-Asawir by
'Ain 'Arab past 'Ain Ibrahim to Megiddo. The king evidently preferred
to make directly for the enemy's position. The officers, on the other hand,
feared the narrow mountain defile, where the army would be strung out
in a long line and so would be particularly liable to attack. The enemy,
sweeping down from the heights on either hand, would be able to cut
such a line in two and do great damage before any united resistance
could be offered. The gentle slopes leading into the wady would offer
opportunities for a considerable body of men to make such a descent
with ease on any army crossing the pass (see View III). If, on the con-
trary, Megiddo could be approached from the side of the plain, not only
would the dangers of the pass the avoided, but ample opportunity
would be given for the use of the chariotry,53 which branch of the service
would be only a hinderancc in the mountain defile. The officers, there-
fore, advocated either one of two other roads. One of these came
out of the mountains towards Taanach. This can have been none other
than the one running around the southern end of the Ridge through the
Plain of ' Arrabeh, entering Esdraelon in the neighborhood of Jenin.^*
By pursuing this course, the plain could be reached considerably to the
south of Megiddo and the advance on the city could then be made by
way of Taanach. Here too the open plain would offer ample opportunity
for manoeuvres and would enable the Egyptians to bring all their force
into action at once, thus avoiding the danger of their being defeated in
detail, as might be the case if they took the 'Aruna road.
The other road favored by the council is less certain of identification.
It is possible that it may have been the road branching off from the
Wady 'Arab at 'Ain 'Arab and issuing from the mountains near Tell el-
Aghbariyeh. This, however, seems very unlikely as the road reaches
53. During the rainy season the plain is very muddy and in the middle is often impassable,
owing to the feet that the drainage from the plain cannot be readily carried off". However, by
the time Thutmose reached this region in May, most of the plain would have been dry enough
to allow of the free use of chariots upon the level, cultivated fields.
54. The advice of the officers would seem to have been dictated by ordinary military pru-
dence, and we cannot but feel that Thutmose was assuming grave responsibilities and taking
great risks when he disregarded it. The king's choice, however, was justified by the event.
28 The Battle of Megiddo
the plain only a short distance from Megiddo and would have been open
to practically the same disadvantages as was the direct road to Megid-
do. Moreover, as ' Aruna probably lay near the junction of these two
roads, the term " 'Aruna Road", used constantly throughout the Annals
to apply to the middle one of the three chief roads, might equally well
apply to either of these two roads. The Annalist would most probably
have used some other term to apply to the road that issued at Megiddo,
^the third road) had he been contrasting it with the road to Tell el-
Aghbariyeh /'the second, road). The road from Tell el-Asawir to Tell
Kaimun seems most likely to have been the "road north of Zefti", be-
ing the counterpart on the north to the road around the southern end of
the Ridge towards Taanach. The only other route, that around the
seaward endof Carmel, is too great a detour to have been seriously con-
sidered. By taking the road issuing from the mountains at Tell Kaimun,
the advantages mentioned as being derived from the use of the fourth
road would be equally well secured, except thtit the fourth road is some-
what easier for chariots. In any case it is obvious that the officers de-
sired to reach the open country on the other side of the Ridge before
encountering the enemy, hence their very evident reluctance to follow
the Pharaoh along the direct road to Megiddo.
In answer to the objections of his officers, Thutmose's anger blazed
up. His reply is one of the most remarkable royal utterances in all the
range of ancient oriental records and fairly rings not only with wrath
but also with contempt. We can picture to ourselves the Pharaoh ris-
ing from his seat as he ends the council in disgust and with scorn bid-
ding those of his officers who are afraid to accompany him follow the
road their fears dictate, but calling upon those who would stand by him
to follow his lead, adding, as a final rebuke, "They shall not think
among the enemy whom Re detests, 'Does his Majesty proceed upon
another road because he is beginning to fear us?' " It is the first instance
in history of one born to lead calling upon him who will to follow him
into danger or be forever branded a coward. And in the reply of the
officers we hear not only the abject submission of the courtier who has
offended royalty, but the shamed acquiescence of the soldier caught in a
situation where he may be accused of cowardice; "Behold us as the fol-
lowing of thy Majesty in whatever place thy Majesty proceeds."
The Battle of Megiddo 29
III
THE CROSSING OF THE CARMEL RIDGE
THE ANNALS, LINES 49-84
Urk. 652 [His Majesty commanded to issue] (50) orders to the entire
army ^^ (51) this road which was becoming narrow.
[Behold his Majesty took] (52) an oath, saying, "I will not per-
mit [my victorious army] to set out (53) in advance of my Majes-
ty." 56 (54) He set out in advance of his troops
himself. [Every man] was assigned (55) his position,^' horse
behind horse, [his Majesty] being (56) at the head of his troops.
Year 23, first month of the third season, day 19; the watch in
[life]58 (57) at the royal tent was at the city of 'Aruna. My
Majesty proceeded (58) northward, bearing^^ his father Amon-
Re. Lord of Thebes, [who opened the way] (59) before me,
5 5- Sethe's restoration would read; "Your victorious lord will protect your footsteps upon
this road, etc."
56. Sethe restores; "Now his Majesty proposed (rdy-n) in his heart that he set out'".
57. Lit. "His steps of marching".
58. A technical phrase. It occurs again in Urk. iv, 656, 13, and also in Ramses II's re-
cord ot" the Kadesh campaign ( Breasted, Battle of KaJei/i, p. 18.) The second occurance in
the Annals is prob.ibly Sethe's authority for the restoration of "life" in the present passage. In
Ramses' inscription the phrase reads, "The goodly watch in life, prosperity and health in the
rent of his Majesty was on the height south of Kedesh." Ramses' phrase is obviously the com-
plete form, which is abbreviated in the Annals. I take it that the "Watch in life, prosperity and
health" is a technical phrase for jthe royal body-guard or the guard especially det.iiled to pro-
tect the roval tent. In that case, both here and in Urk. IV, 656, 13, we may have a nominal
sentence which would read, "The watch in life was in the tent of the kii.g". .As such a guard
would undoubtedly be stationed as soon as the king's tent was pitched at the lime of setting up
camp, the phrase in our text would then become equivalent to "The camp was pitched at
'Aruna". On the restoration of *nh in the text, see Breasted, Ancient Records II, 425, note a.
^9. Lit. "under". Wr sometimes contams so much of the idea of motion that it is
construed with the preposition r, as !n Urk. IV, p. 310, where b' is used of carrying the sacred
image of Amon ( kr )t-f Tmn r hb-f ) across the river to one of his great feasts It is not neces-
sary to translate the passage "under the protection of" as does Breasted, Ancient Records, II, 425,
nor to omit the s-gn altogether as Masuero, Recueil, II, p. 56. The same word, hr, is used of
transporting Amon-of-the-Ways in the Report of Wcnamon; see RecucH, XXI, p 8g.
30 The Battle of Megiddo
Urk. 653Herakhte was (90) my father Amon
strength of sword (61) my Majesty.
His Majesty went forth [at the head of] his [troops] prepared
(62) in numerous battle-array one. [Their] (63)
south wing was atTaanach, [while their] (64) north wing was
at the southern corner of [the valley of the Kina.^^ Then] (65)
his Majesty cried out upon (66) They are fallen.
Now, that [wretched] enemy (67)
Urk. 654... (68) Amon (69) ye
of (70) his Majesty for his might more than (71) ...
Troops of his Majesty in (72) 'Aruna.
Now the rearguard of the victorious troops of his Majesty
was at the [city] of (73) 'Aruna when the vanguard issued at
the valley of the Kina. (74) They filled the mouth of the valley.
Then they said in the presence of his Majesty, L. P. H. , (75)
"Behold, his Majesty goes forth together with his victorious
troops and they fill the (76) valley. Let our victorious lord har-
ken to us this time (77) and let our lord guard for us the rear
Urk. 655 of his troops and his people. (78) When the rear of the troops
goes forth for us, then we shall fight against (79) these Asiatics;
then we shall not give thought [to] the rear of (80) our army.''^!
His Majesty halted outside, waiting (81) there, guarding
the rear of his victorious army.
Now the rear of the expedition (82) was going out upon this
road, when the shadow turned, (83) and his Majesty arrived at
the south of Megiddo on the bank of the Brook Kina, when it
was seven hours from the turning by the sun.
Then the camp of his Majesty was pitched there and com-
Urk. 656 mand was given to the entire army, saying, "Prepare your-
selves; make ready your weapons, for one is to advcince to fight
with this wretched enemy in the morning." Wherefore one was
60. The portion of the text preserved may also read, "Their south wing was at the corner
south of". Sethe restores; "south oi the Brook A'/«a," which restoration 1 have, in part, follow-
ed for reasons given later. As far as the size of the lacuna goes the ori^jinal might have read,
"south of the city of Meg^iddo.
61. This passage must be added to those cited by Breasted, Andent Records, II, ^9, noted,
as instances of a real patriotic feeling evinced by the use of the phrase "our troops".
The Battle of Megiddo 31
proceeding (84) to rest in the royal tent. The officers were pro-
vided for.^2 Provisions for the court were secured. The sentries
of the army made the rounds. ^3 They said, "Steadfast! Stead-
fast! Watchful! Watchful!" The watch in life was at the royal
tent. One came to report to his Majesty, "The land is well;^'*
the troops of the north and the south likewise."
When the council had broken up, the king gave orders to set out on
the 'Aruna road. It is significant that the records so strongly emphasize
the fact that the king led the line of march in person. After the vigoi-ous
repremand he had given his officers at the council, he could do no less
than occupy the place of danger himself. He would thereby also be able
the better to prevent any surprise by the enemy and would encourage
his men by his own example. So, the necessary orders having been giv-
en for the disposition of the troops during the crossing of the mountains,
the army set- out.
At the most commanding position in the pass lies the modern village of
'Ar'arah, which has been identified with the ancient 'Aruna. ^^ j^
support of this identification it may be argued that; first, if the road
running from Tell el-Asawir to Megiddo is the 'Aruna road re-
ferred to in the Annals, then somewhere along the course of the road we
must look for the city of 'Aruna as occupying a prominent position. Sec-
ond, the city must have lain well within the pass, for the Egyptians
had already been compelled to assume a single file formation before they
reached 'Aruna. Third, the distance of 'Aruna from Megiddo is about
half a day's march for an army, which we know from the Annals was
not more than about seven or eight miles at the farthest. ^^ We
must assume that the Egyptians would push on as fast as possible
through this mountain defile so as to free themselves from the danger of
attack as soon as possible, but at the same time they would have been
6i. On miirzusee Gardiner, Admonitions, p. 102-103
63. Lit. ''passed by, crossed over''.
64. This word, mrnv, "waste, might perhaps refer to the source from wliich some of the
troops were drawn. In that case they wouU' be the auxiliary troops from the fringe ot the desert.
But if this surmise were correct, wliy are they mentioned before the regular troops, thejw'yf
of the south and north.'
65. Wiedemann, Aegypt. Geschichte, p. 347. Petrie Hi>t., <]f' Egypt II, p. 325.
66. The distance from Tharu to Gaza is about 125 miles. This the Egyptians covered in
nine davs, m, iking an averaj;e of fourteen miles a day.
32 The Battle of Megiddo
hindered from making their best time by the confined nature of the road.
Fourth, there must have been sufficient room and a sufficient water supply
at 'Aruna to allow of the Egyptian army having camped there one night.
These conditions are all satisfied by the location of 'Ar'arah. For, first,
it occupies the most prominent position in the pass, just at the junction
of the road to Tell el-Aghbariyeh with that to Megiddo and is surround-
ed with sufficient cultivable land to support a fair sized population. Sec-
ond, it lies well within the pass, being about two hours' journey from
the mouth. Third, it is about seven or eight miles from Megiddo, just the
maximum distance we would suppose the Egyptians to have travelled
between 'Aruna and Megiddo. Fourth, it is abundantly supplied with
water, and is located in an opening in the wady large enough to accom-
modate a considerable body of troops (see View II). From these consid-
erations it seems reasonably certain that 'Aruna must have lain some-
where near the site of the village 'Ar'arah. Etymologioally, however, it
seems hardly possible to equate 'Aruna("-rw-7i'J with 'Ar'arah (•^cjc).
If we are right in this identification of 'Aruna with the modern 'Ar-
'arah, then shortly after leaving Yehem the host would have entered
the mouth of the Wady 'Arah and would have found itself in the situa-
tion which the officers of the army dreaded so much, where it was im-
possible to maintain any other than a long-drawn-out line of march.
With this necessity of the topography the account in the Annals entire-
ly agrees, for upon leaving Yehem, the Egyptians are said to have march-
ed, at once, "horse behind horse", in the single file formation that the nar-
row valley demanded. It is not to be supposed that even on the coast plain
from Gaza to Yehem the army had marched in any other than column
formation. In most parts of the valley also this formation could be more
or less maintained. If, however, the enemy had attacked the army in the
open plain, it would have been possible for the Egyptians to have formed
in some sort of battle-array. In the mountain pass, on the other hand,
the long, straggling column necessitated by the narrow road could not
have been organized into any sort of formation. It is on this account
that the record so strongly emphasizes the straggling line which the
country necessitated.
On the thirteenth day of the month (May 12th) the Egyptians were
at 'Aruna, that is, on the third day after they are recorded to have been
The Battle of Megiddo 33
at Yehem. We are not to suppose that it took three days to cover the
distance between the two towns. If we are right in pvitting yehem
somewhere near tlie junction of the three roads across the Ridge, it
would not have taken more than one day for the army to have reached
' Aruna. It is possible that the spies sent out to locate the enemy were
not dispatched till after Yehem was reached, in which case it would
have been necessary for the king to wait a day or two at Yehem for
their return. It is not necessary to suppose that the council was called
on the sixteenth. That date possibly indicates the time of arrival at the
city, at which the king may have remained for several days. We must
suppose that as soon as possible after the announcement of the king's
decision to cross the Ridge directly to Megiddo, the advance was begun,
for there would have been no object in delay, as far as our information
goes. The nineteenth of the month was therefore occupied in the march
to 'Aruna, at which place the Egyptians camped that night. Provided
the location of Yehem as given above is in general correct, it would have
been possible for the king to have pushed on further that night before
camping. But in that case nightfall would, in all probability, have found
the army still toiling through the pass, and they would have been com-
pelled to halt so near to Megiddo that their camp would have been
exposed to attack by the enemy had the latter been vigilant. Moreover,
at 'Aruna there was a good camping-place (see page 10) with plenty
of water, a favorable situation found nowhere else on the road. Fur-
thermore, the distance from 'Aruna to Megiddo, as shown by the time
occupied in crossing the pass the next day, was just about enough to
allow the Pharaoh to get his entire army through the mountains in
the course of the day and enable them to prepare for battle on the
morrow.
In the passage of the mountains the king led the way accompanied
by, or, in the words of the Annals, "bearing" his father, Amon. This is
the only instance I know of in Egyptian records where we are told that
statues or images of the gods were carried into battle, as the Hebrews
carried the ark. The image of Amon in its portable shrine, born on the
shoulders of a body of priests, undoubtedly accompanied the van of the
army where was the king's chariot and "opened the way" before his
Majesty. On the walls at Medinet Habu is a relief depicting the de-
34
The Battle of Megiddo
parture ofRamses III for the first Lybian campaign. ^'^ Before the king is
a chariot bearing the standard of Amon, a ram's head surmounted by
the sun-disk, the whole supported on a pole attached to the chariot
(see Fig. I). Above the chariot is an inscription which reads: "Ut-
terance of Amon-Re, king of gods: 'Lo, I am before thee, lord of the
Two Lands, Usermare-Meriamon. I give [to thee] all [might and power]
among the Nine Bows; terror their chiefs, I will open [ for]
thee the ways of the land of Temeh. I will trample them before thy
horses.' "68 n jg interesting that this phrase "open the ways", so com-
mon in the inscriptions, should be so graphically illustrated by the
Figure I. From Gressmann, Altorientalische Texte und Bilder, II, p. ^4.
chariot of Amon preceding the king along the road to Lybia. Is it not
more than likely that in Thutmose's inscription, where the king is said
to be carrying his father Amon who in turn "opens the way" before him,
we have just such another scene as that shown at Medinet Habu.
We know of instances where portable cult images were carried
67. Champollion, Alinuments, 217. Rosellini, Alonumenti i^torici, 124.
68. Breasted, y4ncient Records, IV, 49.
The Battle of Megiddo 35
far from Egypt, such as the image of Khonsu which was sent to the
land of the Hittites by Ramses II, ^9 or the image of Amon-of-the-Way
that Wenamon carried to the king of Byblosjo The divine names given
to the four divisions of Ramses II's army on the campaign of Kadesh'^i
suggest that perhaps each division of the army bore an image of the
deity under whose special protection it marched. Thutmose III, who
owed his elevation to the throne to the intervention of Amon, might
well emphasize the presence of the deity at the head of the expedition
which was being carried on ostensibly at the god's command.
The fragmentary condition of lines 61-71 makes it impossible to deter-
mine clearly the connection between the portions of the text that still
survive. It is evident, however, that with the words, "pr-t yn h m-f",
that is, "His Majesty went forth", in line 61, the Egyptians had reached
the mouth of the pass and were about to make their exit into the open
plain by the Kina. The "going-forth" was undoubtedly from the narrow
mountain defile. As the mouth of the valley was reached, the Egyptian
vanguard formed in battle-line, ready to resist any attack by the Asia-
tics and to cover the main body of the army still pushing through the
mountains behind. '2
On thus issuing from the mountains the king, to judge from the re-
maining fi-agments of the inscription, called out to his troops as he descri-
ed the Asiatics across the Kina. The few words, "They are fallen. Now
this wretched enemy", suggest such an interpretation and, the second
69. of), lit., Ill, 419 ff.
70. op. lit., IV, 557 ft'
71. op. lit., Ill, 310 ft".
72. Until the appearance of the Urkunden there was no certainty as to who "went forth".
Masoero has supplied a //w-sign after pr-t yn, but, at best, it was a restoration. Owing to the
fact that the statement which immediately follows undoubtedly refers to the disposition of the
Asiatic forces, Breasted, Ancient RecorJi II, 416, interpreted the words pr-t yn as applving to the
Asiatics. He therefore concluded that ttiere h.\d been an engagement in the mountains between
the Egyptians ana the Allies. Hall, Anc. Hin. of the Near East, p. 237, says "The people
of the village of Aruna ******* attacked the troops on the next day, and caused con-
siderable annoyance to the rearguard, which was fighting near Aruna while the king with the van
had crossed the head of the pass without resistance and was descending the slope of the Ruhah
towards Megiddo." Since the publication of the Urkunden, Maspero's restoration is seen to
have been correct, for Sethe has found on the walls at Karnak the traces of a /w-sign, showing
that it was the king, not the Allies, that went torth in battle-array. Therefore Breasted's battle
in the mountains must be given uu. Hall's statement in regard to the rearguard fighting while
the van was already across the mountains is not at ill supported bv the inscriptions, which make
no mention ot any such situation. In fact, all through this section of the Annals the fear of the
Eirvptians is constantly that just the opposite will occur and that the van will be fighting while
the rear are still in 'Aruna without having fought.
36 The Battle of Megiddo
person plural pronominal suffix preserved in line 69 would indicate that
the M'^ords were addressed to those about the speaker. The object of
what was said seems to have been to encourage the troops and perhaps
to point out the successful accomplishment of the royal plan which the
officers had opposed at Yehem.
After the words "numerous battle-array" Sethe would supply "n
gmn-f hry iv' ", that is, "not did he find a single enemy", '3 all of. which
sentence is pui'e restoration except the word translated "single". Despite
the fact that the restoration seems exactly to fill the lacuna, there is
far too little ground for assuming that those particular words are what
occupied the break. For historical purposes restorations which do not
materially modify the meaning of a passage may be accepted with re-
serve even on comparatively slight evidence, but to add the statement
of a fact of such historical importance as the denial of any conflict with
the enemy in a place where such a conflict would naturally be expected,
and that merely on the strength of a single word which does not in it-
self contain any clue to the nature of the lost passage, is too great a
liberty with the text to be accepted, even if the restoration does just
fill the lacuna. The fact that there is no mention of a meeting with the
enemy, as far as the surviving portions of the text go, does not warrant
the insertion of a denial of such an encounter. The best that we can do
with this passage is to say that we do not know what occupied the
lacuna.
The statement that "The southern wing (lit. "horn") was at Taanach
while the northern wing was at the corner " can refer only to
the disposition of the Asiatic force, as Breasted has pointed out.'"* It is
obvious that the enemy had miscalculated the movements of the Egyp-
tian army and expected them to advance by the road around the south-
ern end of the Ridge and so to approach Megiddo from the direction of
Taanach. The Annalist is evidently describing the Asiatic lines as extend-
ing from Taanach on the south to "the corner " on the north.
Sethe's restoration here, "the corner of the valley of the Kina", though
still only a surmise, is possible, for we can hardly beli(>ve that the Asia-
tics would have left Megiddo entirely undefended, and if one end of their
73. Urk. IV, 653.
74. Aticieiit Records, II, 426, note d.
The Battle of Megiddo 37
line reached to the valley of the Kina, which flows by Megiddo, they
would thus be in some position to defend the city. On this hypothesis
we must suppose that the main body was somewhere on the road be-
tween Taanach and Megiddo with its probably detached extremities at
either city, these outposts being the "wings" of the Annalist. They were
thus prepared to mass their forces at either point according as the
Egyptians advanced by Taanach or by the 'Aruna road direct to Megid-
do. Still it is astonishing how little military wisdom the Asiatics seem
to have displayed throughout this whole campaign. They took no ad-
vantage apparently of the opportunity for harassing the Egyptians of-
fered by the narrow mountain pass. In fact, as far as we can see, they
were unaware of which road Thutmose had chosen, until the Egyptians
were almost at Megiddo. It seems to me that we must reach this con-
clusion if we suppose that they allowed the Egyptians to ci-oss the
mountains without attacking them in the narrow defile. At no time
th-oughout the campaign were their chances of successful resistance to
the invader so bright as when the Egyptian force was winding about
among the hills, and this great opportunity they seem deliberately to
have neglected. However, when our sources are so meagre and are also
written from the enemy's standpoint, we cannot be positive on such a
point.
The Annalist informs us that when the vanguard of the Egyptians
had reached the opening of the pass, the rearguard was still far behind
on the other side of the Ridge at 'Aruna, the point from which the army
had set out in the morning. The officep who accompanied the king at
the head of the army must have watched the opening of the valley with
anxious eyes to catch a glimpse of the whereabouts of the enemy and
to make svire that their fears, as expressed at the council at Yehem, were
not about to be realized. As the army turned the last bend of the road,
several hundred yards before it enters upon the plain, they found that
the valley spread out to a couple of hundred yards in width while the
slopes of the hills rose gently on either hand. The eager troops behind,
pushing rapidly forward, not only to see what lay ahead, but also, no
doubt, to free themselves from the dangerous position in which the nar-
rowness of the pass placed them, soon filled the mouth of the valley
(see View I V)i and, we must suppose, in the case of the infantry, even
38 The Battle of Megtddo
the slopes of the hills. What they saw before them was the wide expanse
of level land, probably covered with ripening harvests, stretching for
half a mile to the banks of the Kina, and beyond, about a mile away, the
walls of Megiddo, the stronghold of the enemy and their own objective
(see View V). And beyond the city lay the fertile plain of Esdraelon,
with its grain fields and orchards, extending away to the blue hills of
Galilee. No doubt between the Egyptians and the open plain was the
northern wing of the Asiatic army, now probably in great commotion
as they realized that their enemy had done the thing they had not cal-
culated on and had surprised them with the bulk of their force far down the
road towards Taanach. And no doubt in the Egyptian ranks many an
officer and private looked with longing eyes at the open spaces of the
great plain between which and themselves lay the enemy, and thought
with fear of the long, straggling line of troops hastening over the hills at
the mercy of any strong force which might swoop down on them from
the heights on either hand.
At this point the officers plucked up courage to make one further re-
quest of the king. "Let our victorious lord harken to us this time", they
said, even though he had seen fit to disregard their advice at Yehem.
They then called Thutmose's attention to the troops behind him, who
were gradually filling the mouth of the valley, as one by one the com-
panies of infantry and "squadrons" of chariotry filed out of the narrow
road and took up their positions in the rear of the waiting vanguard.
They urged the king to wait at the mouth of the pass till all his troops
had arrived, so that when the army finally emerged into the open, they
might give all their attention to the enemy in front and m'ght not have
to weaken their strength by being compelled to detach a portion of their
force to cover the arrival of the straggling rear. Now that Thutmose
had actually reached Megiddo and had shown the feasibility of his own
plan of campaign, he seems to have consented willingly to their suggestion,
also, no doubt, realizing the wisdom of not dividing his army in the face
of the enemy. By stationing a suffic'ent force on the hills on either side
of the mouth of the valley, he could command a strong position. On his
left was a long ridge, (marked D on Map II) two or three hundred feet
high, which sloped down on the south into the valley in which the
army then stood, and on the north was protected by th(> wide openuig
The Battle of Megiddo 39
of Wady es-Sitt (see View X). On (he south of the valley-mouth was
another equally high hill (marked E on Map II) which, though hound-
ed by a more shallow wady on the other si(i(\ could still be held against
the attack of a large force. With these two heights in his possession,
and we cannot suppose that he failed to seize them at once, and with
his vanguard, undoubtedly composed of picked troops, facing the enemy
in front, he might feel reasonably safe from any attack by his foes until
the rearguard had finally made its passage of the mountains. By grad-
ually advancing his front into the open but still keeping the mouth of
the valley well covered, he could make room for the fresh arrivals as
they came up, until, when all ttad safely crossed, he could advance bold-
ly with all his force into the fields bordering on the Kina.
At this point in his narrative the Annalist furnishes us with a most
interesting datum. He says : "Now when the rear of the expedition was
setting out upon this road, the shadow turned; and his Majesty arrived
at the south of Megiddo on the bank of the brook Kina, when it was
seven hours from the turning (measured) by the sun." So far as I know
this is the only instance in the Egyptian records where an event is
timed, as we to-day would time it, by the hours of the day. Taking this
passage in conjunction with Borchardt's study of Egyptian sun-clocks,'^
we are able to ascertain the time of the king's arrival at his camping-
place down to the very hour of the day. Borchardt's article is based on
the study of the remains of two such clocks, one of which bears the in-
scription: "Living Horus, Mighty Bull Shining in Thebes, the Beloved
of the Two Goddesses, etc. etc.. King of Upper and Lower Egypt,
Menkheperre (Thutmose HI), Son of Re, ", showing that in the
reign of Thutmose III such instruments for measuring time by the sun's
shadow were already in use. According to Borchardt's reconstruction
(see Fig. II) the instrument was placed so that the transverse piece A-B
lay in a north-south direction, while the longitudinal section C-D would
then extend in an east-west line. The shadow cast by A-B on C-D would
gradually shorten as the sun rose, until at noon time, when the sun
stood directly over head, there would be no shadow upon C-D at all.
The longitudinal section was divided into six parts to correspond to the
six hours of the morning, and as the shadow cast by A-B retreated from
75. Botchardt, "Alti.gyptische Sonnenulirfu", AZ, 48 (1911), p 9 fF.
40
The Battle of Megiddo
one of these parts to another the observer could ascertain with tolerable
exactness the time of day. To tell the afternoon hours it was necessary
to reverse the instrument so that it would face the west, and the pro-
gress of the hours would then be indicated by the lengthening of the
shadow cast by the transverse A-B upon C-D.
This brief summary of Borchardt's reconstruction of the working of
Egyptian sun-clocks gives us the data necessary for the vmderstanding
of the Annalist's statement that the shadow turned. Obviously by this
Figure II. From Zeitschrift tur agvptische Sprache, 48 (191 1), Tatel 2.
phrase he referred to the time at which the shadow, instead of with-
drawing towards C, turned around, as it were, and began to lengthen
out towards D after the reversal of the clock. The turning of the shadow
would then indicate noon, the hours before the shadow turned belonging
to the morning, and those after the shadow turned to the afternoon. The
turning of the shadow cannot very well apply to sunrise, and so many
hours after the turning would therefore not refer to the morning hours.
To speak of the shadow turning instead of the clock being turned would
be no more inconsistent than are many of the terms in popular use to-
day, as when we speak of the sun going down, etc. It is evident that
the rearguard of the Egyptians left ' Aruna at noon or shortly after, that
is, when the shadow turned, and that the king reached the banks of tlie
Kina at seven o'clock in the evening, that is, seven hours from the turn-
ing (measured) by the sun. If the kiiig waited at the opening of the val-
ley for the arrival of the rearguard and then at once moved forward to
The Battle of Megiddo 41
the night's camping- place, it would seem that it took the rearguard
seven hours to cross the Ridge, about the time that we would expect to
be consumed in the passage by troops encumbered with camp furniture
and all the motley array that accompanies an army on the march. If,
therefore, it took the rearguard seven hours to march from 'Aruna to
Megiddo, we must suppose that the van had consumed much the same
time in covering the same distance. As the king was at the mouth of
the valley at least by noon, for the rearguard which left 'Aruna at noon
did not leave till after the van had crossed the Ridge, he must have
started from 'Aruna at least by five o'clock in the morning, the whole
day being thus consumed in the passage. In Palestine in the month of
May it would still be bright daylight at seven in the evening and the
army would therefore have reached its camping-place well before
dark.76
The spot chosen for the Egyptian camp was most certainly the ex-
panse of level ground extending along the south bank of the Kina
(see View VII). A more suitable location could not have been chosen. Here
was an ample stretch of flat land just a,t the opening of the pass (see
Map III). By camping here the army secured its line of commiinication
with the south by which it had just come from the other side of the
Ridge. Besides, the wady of the Kina served as a defence on the two sides
most exposed to attack from the direction of Megiddo. The stream furnish-
ed abundant water for both men and animals. Moreover, if the Egypt-
ians posted a force on the knoll F, they would be able to prevent attacks
from the east during the night. It is obvious that the army did not
move out into the open Plain of Esdra^lon, for to do so they would have
been obliged to pass through the forces of the enemy who held the road
to Taanach and, had they succeeded in doing so, they would have been
cut off from their line of communication over the Ridge. Furthermore,
76. All the current histories have interpreted this passage to mean that the army completed
the crossing of the mountains by about one in the at'ternoon. taking "seven hours from the
turning" to mean seven hours from sunrise. This interprrtation, aside from the fact that the
"turning" seems to have little meaning when applied to sunrise, would be difficult of acceptance,
owing to the facts of the physical situation. That an army of 10,000 to 15,000 men, with all
the camp furniture of an army on a campaign far away from home, and a large part of whose
force consisted of chariots, could traverse a narrow mountain defile eight to nine miles long be-
tween sunrise and one o'clock in the afternoDn is almost inconceivable. An army, strung out in
almost single file, from the time the van left 'Aruna till the rear reached the mouth of the
valley by Megiddo, would certainly have consumed the best part of a day.
42 The Battle of Megiddo
the Annals would seem to indicate that the bank of the Kina south of
Megiddo, at which place the army arrived at seven in the evening, was
the spot where the camp was pitched. Any location on the bank of
the brook out in the open plain would not have been south, but eat<t
or north, of Megiddo, and throughout the Annals the writer is quite
accurate in the indication of direction. Also the location of the camp
at this spot falls in well with the operations in the next day's battle
Our knowledge of the appearance of an Egyptian camp is largely
drawn from the battle reliefs of Ramses II. ^'^ These have been so fre-
quently and so fully described that it is not necessary to enter into a
discussion of the subject here, especially as it does not bear directly on
the problem before us. Suffice it to say that, if we may trust the reliefs,
Ramses' camp was bounded by the shield? of the troops set up on end so
as to inclose a large rectangular piece of ground. In the center of this
inclosure stood the royal tent, around which were camped the troops and
camp-followers. Such in general we may suppose to have been the ar-
rangement of Thutmose's bivouack by the Kina. The Annalist gives us a
glimpse into the routine activities of the camp that shows us how order-
ly war had already become even in this remote age. First of all orders
were issued to the troops to prepare themselves and their weapons for
the morrow's conflict, and we may picture to ourselves the busy scenes
as bowstrings were tested, arrows, speai's and knives sharpened, chari-
ot wheels examined, and all the military accoutrement put in order. The
king withdrew to his tent, doubtless to consult with his officers and de-
cide upon the plan of action to be followed in the morning as based on
the topography of the immediate environs of Megiddo. Some such con-
sultation must have taken place, for it is evident that the next day's
conflict was no haphazzard engagement but a well-ordered and well-
generaled battle with all the physical features of the region taken into
consideration. The phrase which I have translated, "The officers were
provided for" may possibly refer to the issuance of these orders to the
various officers of the army. The words "ivh' n sm,si() ' 'are quite obscure,
but would seem to refer to the distribution of rations to the troops or
court. Then follows the statement that the watch made its rounds and
that the royal guard, "the watch in life", was stationed at the royal
77. Lepsius, Denkma'er, III, 154, 155. Breasted, B<itt!c of KaJesh,. Plate I.
TflE Battle of Megiddo 43
tent. Then, when all these preparations had been carried out, report
was made at headquarters, to put it in modern terms, that "all's well".
The army had settled down to rest before the arduous duties of the
next day.
Of what was going on across the Kina among the Asiatics the Annal-
ist has told us nothing. We can only surmise the movements of the
enemy. That they were taken by surprise is evident from what has
gone before. They had apparently made their preparations for meet-
ing Thutmose in the direction of Taanach,''^ and when they discovered
that he had taken them in the rear, their consternation must have been
great. As, however, Thutmose did not advance from the mouth of the
pass for some five hours or more after the Egyptian vanguard had
accomplished the crossing, the Asiatics would have had abundant time
to recall their main body from the direction of Taanach, only about four
or five miles away, and to prepare to meet the Egyptian advance on the
following day.
The Asiatics would undoubtedly have pitched their camp so as to
place it between the Egyptians and the city (see Map III). No more
favorable location for a camp could have been found than the almost
level top of the mound G just south of Megiddo (see View VI). It is
an elevated p'ece of ground that could therefore be more easily defended
than a lower situation, while by choosing this spot the Asiatics could
protect the city on its weakest side where the wall was lowest and
most accessible. We must also suppose the camp to have been located
at about this spot, rather than on the lower land to the west, north or
east of the city, for on the next day when the center and right of the
Egyptians closed in from the west and south of the city, they seem to
have charged directly through the camp of the Allies. To have made this
possible the camp must have been located at about the spot indicated
above. As to what went on in the Asiatic quarters that night, the An-
nalist has given us no information and it is useless to speculate on such
a subject.
78. At any rate it seems evident that, of the three roads across the Ridge, the Zefti road
did not enter seriously into the calculations of the Asiatics, for they apparently so disposed their
forces as to enable them to concentrate rhe'r troops near the mouth either of the 'Anina road
or of the road bv Taanach. Had tliey anticipated an attack from the Zetti road, they would
most probably have advanced a portion of their force along ttie road north ot Megiddo, a move-
ment which does not seem to have been undertaken at all.
44 The Battle of Megiddo
IV
THE BATTLE OF MEGIDDO
THE ANNALS, LINES 84-90
Urk. 657 Year 23, first month of the third season, day 21; day of the
feast of the new moon as usual. The king appeared early in
the morning. Then orders were issued to the entire army to
cross [the valley of the Kina.]'?^ (85) His Majesty proceeded in a
chariot of electrum, clad in his accoutrements of war, like Horus
the Valiant, Lord of Offerings, like Montu of Thebes. His father
Amon was strengthening his limbs. The south wing of the
army of his Majesty was at a hill south of Kina,
and the north wing was at the north-west of Megiddo, his Ma-
jesty occupying the center. Amon was the protection of his
members. The power of the might of [Set was the strength]
(86) of his limbs.
Then his Majesty prevailed against them at the head of his
Urk. 658 troops; (and when) they saw that his Majesty prevailed against
them, they fled headlong [to] Megiddo with faces of fear. They
abandoned their horses and their chariots of gold and of silver.
They drew them [up] by hoisting with their garments into
this city. Now the people had shut up this city against them
[and they let down] (87) garments to hoist them upward into
this city.
Now had the troops of his Majesty only not given their
hearts to plunder the possessions of the enemy, they would
[have plundered] Megiddo at this moment, while the wretched
enemy of Kadesh and the wretched enemy of this city were
79. The restoration "valley of the Kina" ( \n-t k\-->!^) would seem just to fill the lacuna
as given in the Urkunden, and would also agree with the actual situation as developed in the
discussion above.
The Battle of Megiddo 45
drawn (up) to secure their entrance into their city, the fear of
his Majesty having entered (88) [into their hmbs.] Their arms
were weak. His serpent diadem had prevailed against them.
Urk. 659 Then were captured their horses and chariots of gold and
silver, made an easy [spoil.] Their battle-array was lying
stretched out like fishes in a [corner.]80 The victorious troops
of his Majesty went around counting their respective portions.
Then was captured the tent of [that] wretched [enemy,] which
was worked^' [with (89) silver] The entire army
was rejoicing and giving praise to Anion [for the victory]
which he had given to his son on [this day. They gave praise]
to his Majesty, exalting his victory, They brought up the spoil
they had taken, consisting of hands, of living prisoners, of
Urk. 660 horses and chariots of gold and silver and of painted stuff.
(90) His Majesty commanded his army, saying,
"Capture ye victory. Behold, [every land] is
given [to my Majesty according to the command] of Re this
day; for every chief of every [north]ern country which has re-
volted is within it; for it is the capture of a thousand cities, the
capture of Megiddo. Capture ye, capture ye, thoroughly!"
At this point it is necessary to determine from just what direction
the attack upon the Asiatic lines was delivered on the following day.
Our data for reaching a conclusion on this subject are woefully meagre
and leave us at the last not quite satisfied. Only two statements are
made in the Annals in regard to the location of the Egyptian lines.
First, "Then orders were issued to the entire army to cross [the valley
of the Kina]", and, second, "The south wing of the army of his Majesty
was at a hill south of Kina and the north wing was at the
northwest of Megiddo, his Majesty occupying the center." One other
fact may be added to this scanty information, namely, that the Asiatic
80. Or as Settle divides the text, "like fishes in a round corner". I have followed Breas-
ted's arrangement (Ancient Records, II, 431) and have construed sny with what follows rather
than with what goes before. In any case the passage is obscure.
81. Generally heretofore the hieroglyphic figure of a bird at this place has been read as a
s'-sign, on which reading was based the statement thit the captured tent contained the son of the
king of Kadesh, who thus fell into Thutmose's hands. Sethe, however, reads on the stone a
^'-sign and so restored byk., "worked, wrought," which reading I have here followed.
46 The Battle of Megtddo
camp most certainly lay between the Egyptian army and the city, for,
as has been already pointed out, the Egyptians, in pursuing the Asiatics
fleeing into the city after the battle, came upon the latter's camp and
stopped to plunder it. The camp, therefore, very likely lay almost op-
posite the Egyptian center, so that the troops converging oti the city all
fell to plundering the possessions of the enemy. Had the camp lain to
one side, it is likely that at least a part of the army would have contin-
ued the pursuit of the fleeing foe up to the city walls. On these few
facts and this one deduction must rest the decision as to the direction
from which the Egyptian attack was made.
"The northwest of Megiddo" and ''the hill south of Kina"
mark the two extremities of the Egyptian lines. "The former must re-
fer to the strip of cultivated land between the Tell and the hill A (see
Map II), that is, at or near the northern end of this strip of land where
it opens into the plain of Esdrselon (see View IX). The "hill south of
Kina" is undoubtedly the knoll F. Being a detached eminence
it would easily serve as a defensible termination to a line of battle. By
occupying this rise the Pharaoh could protect the southern wing of his
army and until it moved forward away from the knoll, could prevent
the enemy from turning his right flank. Either C or D, the other two
hills which might be considered south of the Kina, are so much in line
with the hills on either side of them that they would hardly serve
as a natural defence upon which to rest one wing of the army. Nor do
they stand out prominently enough to serve as a distinctive designation
of location. Moreover, as the steepness of the bank of the Kina where
it skirts the south side of the mound H, is too great to allow of troops
making an effective attack on H from that direction, the right or south
wing of the Egyptian force must have been compelled to move round
mound H to the east to attack the Asiatic south wing. If, therefore, the
southern extremity of the Egyptian line rested on knoll F i)efore
the battle, the Pharaoh's troops would have been in a position to
advance directly against the enemy defending the east side of the group
of mounds (see Map IV).
If, therefore, we take the knoll F as the "Hill south of Kina",
we must then decide whether the Egyptian line of battle faced the city
from the west and soutli of Megiddo or from the open plain to the north
The Battle of Megtddo 47
and east, In either case it would be possible to station the troops so that
one wing would be to the northwest of the city and the other wing
would rest on the knoll F. Had the Annalist but seem fit to designate
the wings of the army as right and left, we would then be able to locate
the Pharaoh's line of battle exactly, but as he speaks of them merely as
the north wing and the south wing, we are left to solve our problem in
accordances, with what seems to agree best with all the known circum-
stances, especially with the topography.
The statement that "orders were issued to the entire army to cross
[the Valley of the Kina"] does not throw any light oii this aspect of the
problem. Whether the army was drawn up to the west and south or to
the north and east of the city, it would have been necessary for the
bulk of the troops to cross the Kina before taking up their position. We
can therefore eliminate this datum from the determining factors of the
situation.
That the Egyptian line of battle was drawn up on the north and east
of the city seems highly improbable for the following reasons. First, as
we have seen, the Pharaoh's camp on the night before the battle must
have lain in the open stretch of land between the Kina and the mouth
of the valley through which the 'Aruna roadran. To have advanced into
the open plain would have cut him off from his line of communication
with the south and, in case of defeat, would have exposed his army to
almost certian destruction as it would have cut off the way of retreat.
Second, in advancing into the plain Thutmose would have ex]iosed his
force to a flank attack from the direction of Megiddo, much more than
would have been the case had he moved out to the west and south of
the city. Third, as the Asiatic camp lay between the Pharaoh 's battle-
line and Megiddo, we must suppose that the camp was situated to the
northeast of the city and therefore that the Asiatics had failed to place
themselves between the city and the Egyptians on the previous night.
Fourth, if the Allies' camp was so situated to the northeast of the city,
then it would have been necessary for the Egyptians to make a wide
detour in the Plain in order to take up their station previous to the
battle, and in so doing they would have exposed themselves, when at a
great disadvantage, to the attack of the enemy. Fifth, if the Asiatic
camp lay to the northeast of Megiddo, the Asiatic army would, of
48 The Battle of Megiddo
course, have been drawn up to the north and east of their camp. The
Egyptian army, therefore, in taking up their position to the north and
east of the Alhes, but with the wings of their army resting on the hill
A and the knoll F, would have been strung out in a most remarkable for-
mation. At best their line would have been very thin and would have
formed roughly at least 270' of a huge circle with the Asiatic camp and
army well in the center of the circle. That the Pharaoh would have at-
tempted to assume any such extraordinary formation is as difficult to
conceive as it is difficult to suppose that the Asiatics would have stood
quietly by and either have allowed themselves to be so surrounded or
not have taken advantage of the opportunity afforded by the enemy's
extended and weakened line to cut it in two in the center and roll the
shattered portions back upon the wings. Taking all these circumstances
into consideration, it seems certain that we can dismiss any idea of the
king's having drawn up his lines to the north and east of the city.
Turning to the alternative position, that to the west and south of
Megiddo, we find the following considerations in favor of Thutmose's
having chosen that side of the city for his attack. First, he would be
able thereby to secure his line of retreat back over the 'Aruna road to
the south. Second, he would not have to expose the bulk of his army to
a flank attack while taking up his position. Third, such a location would
allow of our placing the Asiatic camp on the mound G, between the
city and the Egyptian encampment, the place where we would naturally
expect it to be located. Fourth, the Egyptian lines would not have been
drawn out so far but that they could have been compact enough to have
made them an effective attacking force. Their length would have been
only about half that necessary had they taken u]) the other i)osition to
the north and east of Megiddo. Considering the whole situation, it
would appear certain that Thutmose's army was drawn up to the west
and south of the city in the semicircle of cultivated land between the
hills A, B, C, D, and E and the mounds G, H, and I.
On the morning of the battle, the twenty -first day of the first month
of the third season (May 15, 1479), the signal for the commencement of
hostilities seems to have been the appearance of the king from the royal
tent. At once the order was issued, as the Annals has it, "to the entire
army to cross [the valley of the Kina]" As the Egyptian camp most
The Battle of Megiddo 49
certainly stood on the south of the Kina on the flat land between the
brook and the hills D and E, the words lost in the lacuna must have
referred to the depression through which the brook flowed. There is no
other feature of the topography of which the word "cross" could well be
used. It seems safe, therefore, to proceed on the assumption that the
royal command was to cross the Kina. That the words "entire army"
are to be taken literally is impossible, if we are to accept the statement
that the south wing of the Egyptian force was later at the "hill
south of Kina". The lacuna in this instance must also have included
some phrase applicable to the valley of the Kina. If the entire army had
crossed the brook, the south wing could not well be said to be at the
hill south of the brook, for the channel that the stream has cut is so
marked a feature of the topography that we may be sure it, rather than
the hill sorfth of it, would have been mentioned had the brook intervened
between the Egyptian south wing and the hill. When the Annalist
speaks of the "entire army", he probably uses it in a loose sense to des-
ignate the large majority of the troops, including, as we shall see, the
center and the north wing. Only on this interpretation of the words "the
entire army" is is possible to reconcile these conflicting statements. ^2
82. In the current liistories the most detailed accounts ot the position of the Egyptian troops
are given by Maspero, Budge, Breasted and Hall as follows: Maspero, Stnigg/e of the Nations,
p. 258, "By dawn the next day the whole army was in motion. It was formed into a single
line, the right wing protected by the torrent, the left extended into the plain, stretching bevond
Megiddo towards the north-west." Budge, Hist, of Egypt, IV, p. 33-34, "At d.iybreak on
the 21st the whole army marched out in single formation, its right wing resting on the river and
its left reaching to Megiddo on its north-western side." Brensted, Hiit. of Egypt, p. 289, "Late
in the afternoon of the same day (the fourteenth) or during the ensuing night, Thutmose took
advantage of the enemy's position on the east and south-east of his own force to draw his own
line around the west side of Megiddo and boldly thr'^w out his left wing on the northwest of the
city. He thus secured, in case of necessity, a safe and easy line of retreat westward along the
Zefti road, while at the same time his extreme left might cut off the enemy from flight north-
ward." Hall, Anc. Hist, of the Near East, p. 238, "The Egyptians who advanced in line,
pivoting on their right wing, which remained upon the spur of hill above el-Lejja and south of
the brook Kina, until the left wing had swung around to the north-east of Megiddo itself." All
these interpretations agree in general and also, to a large extejit, fit in with the local topography.
In some points, however, they are open to criticism. Both Maspero and Budge state that the
right wing rested on the River Kina, Vvhereas ths Annalist "States that it rested on "a
hill south of. Kina", which certaitily cannot be interpreted to mean the river
itself. Also the Annals give no support to Budge's phrase, "in single formation." Breasted sug-
gests that the Egyptians took up their position "late on the same day (the day of crossing
the mountains) or during the ensuing night." However, he interpreted differently the phrase
which I have translated "the king appearei' early in the morning," The latter translation would
preclude the idea of the Egyptians iiaving taken up their position before the morning of the battle.
Hall's statement that the Egyptian army piloted on their right wing, which remained on a squr
ot hill above el-Lejja [sic) is difficult to understand in the face of the configuration of the coun-
try, tor It would seem to necessitate the crossing of the low limestone hills around Megiddo bv
50 The Battle of Megiddo
In order to reach the north bank of the Kina, the Egyptian force
would have to cross the stream at or near the point "a" at the
opening of the Wady es-Sitt. This would have been necessitated by the
depth of the channel that the stream has cut across the flat cultivated
land. As has already been pointed out, this channel is some fifteen or
twenty feet deep at "b", while at "a" it is only two or three feet deep.
As there was a body of Egyptian chariotvy with the center of the army,
it would be necessary for them to find some point at which the crossing
could be easily made, and such a point is found anywhere along the
course of the stream south of "a". That all the chariots in the Egyptian
ranks were with that portion of the army north of the Kina is certain,
for the banks of the stream between "b" and the place where the brook
crosses the Taanach road at "c" are so steep, in places being practically
perpendicular, as to preclude all idea of chariots crossing the stream be-
tween those points, especially in the face of an enemy, as would have
been necessary had the chariots advanced towards the city from the
south of the Kina.
As the Egyptians were the attacking force, their formation and posi-
tion would necessarily be determined to a great extent by the location
and disposition of the Asiatic army. It will therefore be necessary to
consider the position of the Allies before proceeding further with the
discussion of the Egyptian lines of battle. With their camp pitched on
mound G there would be but one formation natural for the Allies to
assume. It is hardly conceivable that they would have foregone the ad-
vantage to be derived from the elevated position of the mounds. We
must suppose that their lines were drawn up around the edge of mounds
G, H and I. By this formation they would have had the natural defence
against the onslaught of the Egyptians that the sloping sides of the
mounds afforded and, in the case of the south wing, the channel of tbe
Kina also (see Map IV). That there was a strong body of chariots with
the Allies is certain, not only from the fact that the chariot as an instru-
ment of warfare was in use in Asia before it was known in Egypt,
but also from the fact that among the spoil taken from Megiddo after the
the ch.Triots in the center of the Egyptian lines, .111 impossible feat. All there accounts, however,
agree that the attack on Megiddo was delivered from the south and west of th • city and not
from the side of the plain, though in one or two instances the accompanying mai's do not b,o
place the battle-field.
The Battle of Megiddo 51
battle were 924 chariots and 2,238 horses of all kinds. We need not sup-
pose that all of them were present in the battle. Undoubtedly many of
them were taken during the course of the later siege and some may have
come from surrounding towns, the spoil from which has apparently been
included in that from Megiddo in the lists of booty. This is by far the
largest number of chariots recorded as having been taken in any battle
during Thutmose's campaigns. The only other three instances in which
the numbers have survived give us 13 chariots from I-n-r-t^^ on the sev-
enth campaign, 15 from the district of Nuges^"* on the ninth campaign,
and 60 from I-r-y-n and Naharin^^ on the tenth campaign. But as in other
respects the numbers in the lists of booty from Megiddo are far in ex-
cess of those recording the spoil from the later campaigns, we must sup-
pose that the forces put into the field by the Allies at Megiddo were larg-
er than the Egyptians encountered in any of the subsequent campaigns
where they were dealing with more or less isolated states instead of
with a wide spread and powerful coalition.
As has already been said, it is not probable that all the chariots and
horses which figure in the lists of booty from Megiddo were actually
present in this battle. There must have been a sufficient number present,
however, to have constituted a considerable portion of the Asiatic
strength. It is necessary, therefore, in determining the position of the
allied troops to take this body of chariots into consideration. If we are
right in placing the Egyptian lines in a semicircle along the strip of
cultivated land between the foothills and the mounds on which the Asia-
tics were camped, that consideration alone would lead us to conclude
that the enemy was drawn up in roughly similar formation opposite
them. When we examine the topography of the battle-field, we see at
once that such a formation is exactly that which an army occupying
the mounds G and H, and possibly I, would be likely to assume. By
arranging their lines along the top of the slopes on the west and south
of the mounds G, H and I, the Asiatics would be able to secure what
advantage was to be derived from forcing their opponents to attack
them while charging up hill. Moreover, should they themselves charge
83. Urk. IV, 691.
84. Uri. IV, 704.
85. Urk. IV, 711.
52 The Battle of Megiddo
forward against the Egyptians, they would have the advantage of ad-
vancing down hill, as did the Greeks at Marathon. If we consider it like-
ly that the Allies would thus accommodate themselves to the topog-
raphy of the country, there can then be only one location where they
could conceivably have placed their chariotry. The northern part of the
western slope of mound G is too steep to allow chariots to descend with
any assurance that they would arrive at the bottom of the incline in an
upright position. The same is true of the south and east side of mound
H. However, between the northwest side of mound G and the south
side of mound H the descent from the mounds to the cultivated land
below is quite gradual, allowing a space about half a mile long down
which chariots could advance with ease (see View XIII). It is at this
point in the Asiatic lines, therefore, that we must locate their chariotry.
It is there also, in the center of their force, that we would naturally ex-
pect them to mass their greatest strength, opposite the portion of the
Egyptian army that Thutmose himself led in person.
With the Allies thus disposed, the location of the Egyptians becomes
fairly certain. The north wing, which was to the northwest of Megiddo,
was drawn up along the foot of the hill A with a portion of the Asiatic
foot opposite it on the side of the mound G. The Egyptian center, prob-
ably composed largely of chariots, took up its position along the foot of
the hills B and C opposite the Asiatic center, which was on the western
edge of the mound H. Then the Egyptian south wing, where only foot-
soldiers were practicable, probably held the ground occupied on the pre-
ceding evening by Thutmose's camp, the southern extremity of the
wing resting on the knoll F.
When once the battle was joined, the chariots would charge at
full speed upon the opposing ranks. At the word of command, therefore,
we may suppose that the Egyptians advanced upon the mounds G, H
and I from the west and south. Direct advance upon the south of mound
H would be very difficult, as the banks of the Kina and the slope of the
mound is steep at that point. We may therefore suppose that the Asia-
tics left only a small force to hold this jwsition and placed their
south wing on mound I, one extermity of the line be'ng protecte;! by tlie
steep side of mound H and the other by the channel of the Kina. If the
south wing of the Egyptians was compose! of infantry, it would be pos-
The Battle of Megiddo 53
sible for them to cross the Kina to the attack of the Asiatic south wing.
When once this wing had been broken, the Egyptians could then attack
the Asiatic main body in the rear with teUing effect. It is possible that
some such movement, rapidly executed, won the day for the Pharaoh.
Of the actual conflict which took place there is not a vestige of infor-
mation. To judge from the Annalist's narrative it would seem that the
Asiatics fled without striking a blow. "Then his Majesty prevailed against
them at the head of his troops; and when they saw that his Majesty
prevailed against them, they fled headlong to Megiddo with faces of fear.
They abandoned their horses and their chariots of gold and of silver. They
drew them up by hoisting with their garments into this city, for the
people had shut up the city against them, and they let down garments
to hoist them upwards into the city." That the Allies held their ground
for any great length of time seems unlikely, if we are to trust the state-
ment of the number of hands cut from the dead, only 83 being recorded
among the spoil from Megiddo.^^ Although this figure may not represent
the exact number of the slain, it is evident that the Asiatics fled after
offering very little resistance. Why they did so is not plain. They prob-
ably mustered a considerable force and they certainly had the advan-
tage of position. It is likely, however, that they had been hastily
gathered together, many undoubtedly having been forced into the coa-
lition against their will, as was sometimes the case among the Syro-
Palestinian allies in the later period of the Assyrian invasions. It is pos-
sible that the Egyptian force proved to be larger than the Asiatics had
expected to encounter. Moreover, the seat of the rebellion was in the
north, and many of the Allies must have felt themselves far away
from their home land and have lost interest in the conflict as they ad-
vanced towards the south. Perhaps the fact that the Pharaoh had out-
86. Only once more, on his last campaign, does Thutmose record tlie number of hands
taken from the slain, tbev then amounting to only 29 (^Urk. IV, 731). These figures from
Thutmose's campaigns are the smallest, as far as I know, of any in the Egyptian royal annals.
The number of liands recorded as taken from the slam in battle increase with the later inscrip-
tions. In the time of the great war that Merneptah waged with the Lybians and their allies from
among the northern invaders, we find at least 3,410 hands taken (Breasted, Ancient Records,
III, 588), while in Ramses Ill's Lybian campaigns the figures run into the twelve thousands
(Breasted, op. cit. IV, 54). Either the earlier wars were fought with far less numerous foes
than in the time of the great invasions of the XIX and XX Dynasties, or the later accounts are
greatly exaggerated, or the custom of cutting c.fF the hands of the slain was much more com-
monly practised in later times than under the XVIII Dynasty, with whom the custom makes
its first appearance.
54 The Battle of Megiddo
manoeuvred them would have upset any previously laid plans of the
Allies. Whatever may have been the reason, the Asiatics fell back be-
fore the Egyptian advance and their rout was immediately complete.
The situation at the Battle of Megiddo was not unlike that which
subsequently developed in the course of the action at Kadesh between
Ramses II and the Hittites.^' In the latter case the Egyptian camp lay
along the bank of the Orontes and the Hittites, in attacking the camp,
threw out their wings to either side and inclosed the Egyptian army,
driving it back towards the river. In the battle of Megiddo the Egyp-
tian army threw out its wings and inclosed the Asiatic army, driving
it back through its camp to the city of Megiddo behind. At Kadesh the
utter destruction of the Egyptian force was prevented by the fact that
the Hittites stopped to plunder the Egyptian camp. The same event in
the battle of Megiddo prevented the total destruction of the Allies. As
Thutmose's army closed in on the Asiatic forces, the Egyptians in pur-
suing the fleeing foe, found it necessary to pass through the enemy's
camp, and the rich plunder that lay everywhere around proved too
much for their discipline. Forgetting the routed Asiatics, the Pharaoh's
army set to looting the captured camp, thus affording the enemy the
opportunity to effect their entrance into Megiddo or to flee to the north
across the plain of Esdrselon. What might, therefore, have proved the
total annihilation of the Asiatics, was turned into a mere defeat, though
a severe one, and Thutmose found that the cupidity of his troops was to
cost him still further efforts.
When the Asiatics turned to flee before the Egyptian onset, they
found themselves confronted with a most dangerous situation. The in-
habitants of the city, who must have been intently watching the strug-
gle from the top of the wall, when once the magnitude of the disaster
which had befallen their arms became apparent, lost all thought for the
safety of the survivors and shut the gates of Megiddo in the faces of their
troops fleeing to the city for safety. Few, if any, of the chariots of the
Allies were saved. Had the conflict taken place in the open plain, many
of the Asiatics could have made use of their chariots in effecting their
escape across the plain. That, however, was impossible in the situation
in which they found themselves. On the west, south, and southwest
87 Breasted, Battle of Kadesh, p. 34.
The Battle of Megiddo 55
were the advancing Egyptians, while to the north lay the city, its gates
shut against friend and foe alike. Escape, except over the city wall,
was possible only to the northeast, and to flee in that direction it was
necessary for them to cross their camp and descend the steep sides of
the mound G on the northeast, a decline too precipitate for horse
and chariot, even had they been able to make their way through the
debris scattered about the camp. As a result of this unforseen situation,
the Asiatics "abandoned their horses and their chariots of gold and of
silver" and took to their heels for safety. This fact probably accounts
for the large number of horses and chariots mentioned above as enu-
merated among the spoil of Megiddo. Many of the Allies must have es-
caped northward into the plain of Esdraelon and beyond, especially
when they found the city gates closed against them. When once they
had reached the plain, they would have been safe, for the Egyptians, as
we saw, had abandoned the pursuit for the lure of plunder. Those who
turned towards the city, among which number were the kings of Kadesh
and Megiddo, were drawn up into the city by the inhabitants. The glacis,
extending along the base of the wall, allowed the fugitives to get near
enough to the top of the wall so that the inhabitants, by lowering the
long girdles from their waists, could pull them up to the top. The
Egyptian sense of humor is evident in the relish with which the Annalist
describes the undignified escape of the kings, dangling at the ends of the
lowered garments. Had the Egyptians pursued the Asiatics, they would
undoubtedly have been able to inflict great loss upon the mass of dis-
organized fugitives, struggling for an opportunity to climb into the city.
The absorption of the victors in the plundering of the camp could not
be better illustrated than by the fact that the enemy were allowed the
time necessary to effect their escape in this cumbersome fashion. It is like-
ly that the royal fugitives did not long remain within the walls, for
when Megiddo finally surrendered after a siege, they were not among
the prisoners. Probably seeing the hopelessness of the situation, they
lingered in the city only long enough to gather a few followers, and
then escaped by the northern gate, still surviving,**^ just above the
terrace-like projection on the north of the Tell.
Meanwhile the Egyptian army was gathering in a rich harvest of
88. Schumacher, Tell el-Mutesdlim, II, plate a.
56 The Battle of Megiddo
spoil. Besides the chariots already spoken of, the hands cut from the
bodies of the few Asiatics who had fallen in battle, totaling only 83, were
gathered together as evidence of victory. Many of the enemy must have
been made captive in the confusion of the rout and these too counted as
spoil. One of the most conspicuous prizes, however, was the tent of the
king of Kadesh, a sumptuous affair, supported by seven poles and work-
ed, probably, with silver. It undoubtedly contained handsome furniture,
a prize for that time as notable as was, at a later day, the famous tent
of Darius captured by Alexander, the Great. All this booty seems to
have been gathered together before the king. A large share of the spoil
was made over to the treasury of Anion. Much must have gone to re-
plenish the royal coffers. Some of it undoubtedly was given as rewards
to those members of the army who had distinguished themselves in the
engagement.
At this point an interesting supplement to the Annals is furnished by
the biography of Amenemheb, one of Thutmose's genecals, who accom-
panied the king on many of his campaigns, though whether he was pre-
sent at Megiddo is uncertain. In relating his part in Thutmose's cam-
paigns in Syria, he says :
When his Majesty cams to Nahirin, I brought off three msn from the fight
there ; I set them before thy Majestv as living prisoners." "Again I toiighton
that expedition in the land of Carchemish. I brought off as living
prisoners. I set them before mv lord. He rewarded me with a great reward."
Again I beheld his victory in the countrv of Takhsi, the wretched, in the city
of Mero I brought off Asiatics, 3 men, as living prisoners. Then
my lord gave to me the gold of honor; list thereof: 2 flies, a lion, a female slave
and a male slave. "^^
The larger objects of spoil were thus brought up before the king, who
undoubtedly indicated the share belonging to Amon, that des-gned for
the royal treasury, and that to be divided among the army. In the days
of Ahmose I it Wc\s the duty of the royal herald to present to the sover-
eign those of his coinmanders who had a claim on the royal favor be-
cause of conspicuous valor.^o We may picture to ourselves a scene of bar-
baric splendor as the Pharaoh sat enthroned upon the battlefield, sur-
rounded by his officers and troops, while Intef, the herald,^' brought be-
89. Breasted, Ancient Records, II, 581 fF.
90. Breasted, op. lit. II, 9, 11.
91. Breasted, o/>. cit. II, 767 fF.
The Battle of Megiddo 57
fore the king, one by one, the candidates for the sovereign's rewards. And
much of the praise that the army is said to have given to the king prob-
ably arose from the acclamations of the soldiery as to one after an-
other of their favorite officers Thutmose distributed the marks of his favor.
We cannot suppose, however, that much time was consumed in this
wise. Thutmose realized that his work was only half done while Megid-
do itself remained in the enemy's hands. He therefore urged on his
army to continue the successful efforts they had begun, adding: "Behold,
[every land] is given [to ray Majesty according to the command] of Re
this day; for every chief of every northern country which has revolted is
within it; for it is the capture of a thousand cities, the capture of Me-
giddo." But apparently the great opportunity had been lost. The delay
occasioned by the plundering of the camp had been sufficient to allow the
leaders of the Allies to escape, and when finally the city fell, "every
chiefs of every northern country" was no longer within it.
58 The Battle of Megtddo
V
THE SIEGE OF MEGIDDO
THE ANNALS, LINES 90-98
Behold, (91) [officers] of the nuiff to
hasten [to cause that] every [man should know] his posi-
tion. They measured [this] city, inclosing it with an earth-
work, fenced about with the green wood of all their pleasant
Urk. 661 trees, while his Majesty himself was upon the fortress, south
of this city, watching (92) [upon it day and night.]
inclosed with a thick wall with
its thick wall. The name was called "Menkheperre-is-the-en-
snarer-of-the-Asiatics". People were appointed to watch at
the tent of his Majesty, to whom was said, "Steadfast! Stead-
fast! Watchful! watchful!" [Now] his Majesty (93)
[It was not pei-mitted that] one of them [go out] to the out-
side upon the back of this wall except to go out to knock (?) at
the door of their fortress.
Now everything that his Majesty did to this city and to this
wretched enemy together with his wretched army was record-
ed on the day by its name, by the name of the voyage, by Ibe
Urk. 662 name of the officers of the (94) rnnft
They were recorded upon a roll of leather in the temi)!('
of Amon on this day.
Now the chiefs of this country came upon their bellies to kiss
the earth because of the might of his Majesty; to beg the
breath for their nostrels, because great was his power and be-
cause .great was the might of Amon over [every] foreign coun-
try. All the chiefs were brought because of the might of his
Majesty, bearing their tribute of silver, gold, lapis-lazuli, mal-
The Battle of Megiddo 59
akite, and carrying in clean grain, wine, cattle, small cattle, for
the army of his Majesty.
Urk, 663 One gang of them was bearing tribute southward. Then
his Majesty appointed anew the chiefs of (96) [every city]
Megiddo: 340 living
captives, 83 hands, 2,041 mares, 191 female colts, 6 stallions,
male colts, 1 chariot worked with gold, its [pole] of
gold, belonging to that foe; [one] beautiful chariot wrought
with gold belonging to the chief of (97) [Megiddo.]
Urk. 664 892 chariots of his wretched army: total 924. 1 beautiful
bronze suit of armor of that foe; one beautiful bronze suit of
armor of the chief of Megiddo; 200 suits of armor of his
wretched army, 502 bows, 7 poles of mery- wood wrought with
silver of the tent of that foe.
Now the army [of his Majesty] seized (98)
387 , 1,929 cattle, 2,000 small cattle, 20,500
small white cattle.
Apparently no effort was made to take the city by storm. Just why
Thutmose did not make such an attempt at once is hard to surmise. We
know from the results of the excavations at Megiddo that the place was
strongly fortified, but brick walls, even of the strongest, were no deterrent
to the king on his later campaigns when he breached the walls of
Kadesh, a much more formidable fortress than Megiddo.^2 n jg possible
that he realized what was apparently the real situation in the city,
namely, that no preparation had been made to resist a long siege, and
he may therefore have decided to let hunger fight for him, rather than
risk the chance of a repulse if he attempted to take the place by storm.
He therefore issued the necessary orders and the preparations for the
siege began.
The details of the methods pursued by the Egyptians in the siege are,
like the details of the battle, very obscure. The Annals state that "they
measured this city, inclosing it with an earthwork, fenced about with
the green wood of all their pleasant trees, while his Majesty himself
was upon the fortress east of the city, watching [upon it day and night.]
92. Breasted, Ancient RecorJi, II, 590. ,
60 The Battle of Megiddo
inclosed with a thick wall with its th'.ck
wall. Its name was called, 'Menkheperre-is-the-ensnarer-of-the-Asia-
tics'. It was not permitted that one of them go out to the outside upon
the back of this wall except to go out to knock at the door of their in-
closure." In the account of the feasts and offerings instituted by the
king on his return from this campaign, Thutmose says that he made
these offerings "when my Majesty returned from the land of Retenu on
the occasion of the first victories which my father Amon gave to me in
his giving to me every land of Zahi, assembled and shut up in one city,
********I ensnared them in one city. I built upon them with
a thick wall to of the breath of life, by the favor of my
father Amon."^^ Another fragment containing an account of the first
campaign preserves the meagre statement: "Majesty surrounded it with
a wall, made thick Not did they breathe the breath
of life, being surrounded in front of their wall."^*
Before making any suggestions in regard to the method pursued by
the Egyptians in constructing this wall, I should like to quote a passage
from Thucydides' account of the siege of Plataea by the Peloponne-
sians. The narrative runs;
"In the first place the soldiers felled the fruit-trees and surrounded the city
with a stockade, that henceforth no one might get out. "Fhey then began to
raise a mound against it, thinking that with so large an amy at work this would
be the speediest way of taking the place. So they cut timber from Cythaeron
and built on either side of the intended mound a frame of logs placed crosswise
in order that the material might not scatter. Thither they carried wood, stones,
earth and anything which would fill up the vacent space, a. * * * * The
Peloponnesians, having failed in this, as in their former attempt, surrounded
Platasa with a wall. Trenches out of which they took clay for the bricks were
formed both on the inner and outer side of the w;i]l."35
Taking this passage from Thucydides in conjunction with the account
in the Annals it would seem most likely that Thutmose first marked
out, or "measured", a line of circumvallation along which edrth works
were to be thrown up. It is possible that the timbers used in "fencing-m"
the city were employed, as at Plataea, to strengthen the earthworks,
forming a sort of framework in which to pack the e.irth and stones. The
93. Breasted, op. cit. 6 1 6.
94. Breasted, op. cit. 440.
95. Thucydides (Jowett's translation), II, 75-78.
The Battle of Megiddo 61
trees^s may, on the other hand, have been used, as Maspero suggests,^''
to form a sort of stockade or palisade, which could be easily and quickly
erected to assist in shutting up the city until the heavier rampart of
earth could be thrown up. Earthworks about two miles long would ef-
fectively inclose the Tell. At least one tower or bastion was raised upon
the wall, though it is not at all unlikely that such towers were located
at intervals along the entire line of siege works. The one tower men-
tioned in the Annals stood on the east of the city. Here the king made
his headquarters, directing the troops from this advantageous posi-
tion where the widest outlook over the operations could be secured.
This method of conducting a siege by walling in a town was in use
throughout antiquity. An interesting parallel is recorded on the north-
Syrian stela of Zakir, king of Hamath, dating from the eighth century
B. C.98 Zakir relates how Bar-Hadad, son of Hazael, king of Aram, assem-
bled seven kings against him:
'•All these kings erected entrenchments against Haz[rak.] They threw up a
wall higher than the wall ot Hazrak and exxavated a moat deeper than [its moat.] "
The rampart that Thutmose erected around Megiddo could hardly have
been as high as the wills of the city except on the south, owing to the
fact that the city stood on a natural elevation from the base of which
the land slopes away on the west, north and east. Moreover, as the
Egyptians do not seem to have done more than starve the city into sub-
mission, it was not necessary to raise the ramparts high enough to over-
look the city.
The sources omit all mention of any encounter between the Egyptians
and the Asiatics during the siege. That such conflicts occurred we may
feel certain, and in the biography of Amenemheb we have a suggestion
of the many stirring events, the details of the story that the Annals give
only in outline. As the siege progressed, the supplies in the city ran short.
96. To-d,iy the region around the Tell is utterly destitute of' trees. In Thutmose's day,
however, it was probablv heavily wooded. On the south side of the Carmel Ridge are still the
remains of the great forest for which this region was once famous (Josephus, JVars, XIII, 2.
Strabo, XVI, 26). Possibly this forest extended over t> the Esdra?lon side of the Ridge and afford-
ed Thutmose the trees needed for his siege-works However, the term "pleasant (lit. sweet)
tre^s" used in the Annals would seem to refer rather to fruit trees, such as the olive, than to
ordinary forest timbt-r. In the Middle Ages there were many fine gardens in and about the plain
aniH the same may have been true even at this early date. The Papyrus Anastasi I, referred to
earlier, would also indicate that the district was well wooded.
97. Maspero, Struggle of the Nations, p. 258.
98. Pognon, Inscriptions Stmitifues, p. 173.
62 The Battle of Megiddo
Megiddo was well supplied with water, to be sure, from 'A^n el-Kubbi
at the northern base of the Tell. Schumacher has demonstrated that
this spring is an artificial source, the water being brought down in an
underground channel from 'Ain es-Sitt.99 It is also highly pro])abl(' that
there existed some connection with this channel within the city itself as
the excavations at other Palestinian sites have shown to have been cus-
tomary. It was lack of food rather than of water that probably caused
the surrender of the city. The Annals state that the Egyptians did not
allow any of the Asiatics to "go out to the outside upon the back of this
wall except to go out to knock (?) at the door of their inclosure." This
statement can only mean that none of the inhabitants of Megiddo were
allowed to leave the city unless they came out to surrender to the
Egyptians. In this way the siege continued until famine, most probab-
ly, forced the inhabitants to surrender.
The siege had begun on May 15th. The next date in the campaign
that we are able to fix is not later than October 11th, at which time
Thutmose was in Thebes celebrating a feast of victory. In the interval
occurred the siege, a march to southern Lebanon where three cities
were captured and a fortress of some kind was constructed, and the re--
turn to Egypt. The operations subsequent to the fall of Megiddo could
not well have been carried out in less than three months and probably
consumed even more time. If, as seems evident, Megiddo was unprepar-
ed for a siege, a month would be ample for the interval between the
commencement of the work on the inclosing rampart and the surrender
of the place. But this again, like so much connected with the battle, is
at best conjecture.
The fall of the city carried with it the submission of the other towns
and villages in the region around Megiddo. Being the most commanding
fortress between Jezreel and the coast, it must have exercised control
over an extensive territory, the inhabitants of which naturally looke 1
to Megiddo as their protector and their place of refuge in time of danger.
It is not at all unlikely that the leisurely march of the Egyptic\ns from
Gaza to Yehem had seen the submission of many of the towns and
strongholds in the south. If they had joined in the revolt the dec'sion
of the Allies to make their stand at Megiddo must have loft tlie state
99. Schumacher, Tell el-Mutesellim, I, p.i6o.
The Battle of Megiddo 63
to the south defenceless before the Egyptian advance. With the fall of
Megiddo the towns in northern Palestine would undoubtedly have seen
the uselessness of further resistance and would have hastened to make
their submission. The Annals tell us that "the chiefs of the country
were coming upon their bellies to kiss the earth because of the might of
his Majesty, to crave breath for their nostrils, because great was his
power and because great was the might of Amon over every country.
All the chiefs were brought because of the might of his Majesty, bearing
their tribute."
The importance of the fall of Megiddo cannot be overestimated. It
crushed once for all the rebellion in the south. In the subsequent cam-
paigns we have no reference to any serious trouble south of the district of
Nuges and the southern Lebanon. This overwhelming defeat of the Allies
just at the beginning of their rebellion served largely to break up
the alliance, and the later campiagns of Thutmose were almost en-
tirely against a succession of isolated powers. Only in the extreme north,
in Naharin and the Orontes valley, was any united effort made to stem
the tide of Egyptian advance. A coalition of all Syria-Palestine was
made impossible by the crushing blow that the Allies had received at
the very beginning of the movement. It gave the Pharaoh the prestige
gained from success in the initial battle of the war, and to a great extent
paved the way for his subsequent victories in the north. Since the
fall of Sharuhen, after a three years' siege by Ahmose I a century earli-
er, it was the most important single step towards the final conquest of
the country by Egypt. It was a fitting introduction to the wars of the
greatest conqueror the world had then seen. That it made a lasting
impression on the people of the time is evident from the many references
to the battle as well as from the fact that the Annals devote almost
as much space to this first campaign as to all the succeeding ones put
together. It is the first battle in history in which we can in any meas-
ure study the disposition of troops and as such forms the starting point
for the history of military science.
View III. — Looking southwest along the Aruna Road from a point about a
mile above the northern opening of the valley.
View IV. — Looking southwest along the Aruna Road about a quarter of a
mile above the northern opening of the valley.
w
p^
y.
X
>
fe
>,
^
View X. — Wady es-Sitt
View XI. — The Wady of the Kina, showing the deep trench the brook has cut
across the plain.
View XII.— Profile of east slope of Tell el-Mufesellini where Megiddo stood
iHi
■Miim}^,-?^
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